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Abstract
Essays on Factor Reallocation and General Equilibrium
Analysis
Xintong Yang
My dissertation studies the sectoral and regional reallocation of capital and
labor for an economy in transition using general equilibrium model framework.
The first chapter, “Capital in Transition: Housing and Sectoral Reallocation in
the Long Run”, studies the sectoral allocation of capital between housing and
non-residential sectors using a two-sector general equilibrium model in a neoclas-
sical growth environment. Calibrated to both the United States and China, the
model can account for both the positive correlation between the share of housing
capital and the consumption-output ratio in the United States and the negative
correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio
in China. The calibration to the Chinese economy implies that the rapid increase
in the share of housing capital and the simultaneous decrease in the consumption-
output ratio observed in China can be rationalized by a combination of three
factors: a high elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, a high capital
intensity of production of the housing sector, and a low initial share of housing
capital before the Chinese housing market reform. This paper provides a tractable
framework to understand the sectoral allocation of capital between housing and
non-residential sectors across countries.
ix
The second chapter, “Human Capital Spillover and Housing price”, provides a
model framework to study the relationship between the external effect of human
capital and housing price growth in the SEZ economy in China. In a two-region
model, high wage in the SEZ region reflects high level of human capital, and these
jobs are not available to low human capital migrants from the non-SEZ economy.
The migrants come to the SEZ economy for two reasons: on the one hand, the
SEZ economy is a better place to accumulate human capital and earn a higher
wage in the future; on the other hand, the SEZ economy has a better amenities
for living. In the baseline model with migration, the share of population that
choose to migrate to the SEZ economy is determined by the utility equalization
between living in either economy. In the baseline model, the migration occurs all at
once at the first period. Further, I extend the baseline model by incorporating the
spillover effect of human capital: time invested in human capital accumulation has
a higher return in high human capital environment. In this case, the migration to
the SEZ economy becomes increasingly attractive as the gap between the human
capital leaders and followers increase. By comparing the extended model with the
baseline, I capture the significant positive impact of human capital spillover on
the increase of housing prices.
The third chapter, ‘’Dynamic Arrow-Debreu Economy for General Equilibrium
Analysis”, coauthored with Cheng-Zhong Qin, develops a dynamic Arrow-Debreu
abstract economy to more closely capture the timing of moves of Walrasian gen-
x
eral equilibrium model. Instead of inducing a pseudo game, the extensive form
of the dynamic Arrow-Debreu abstract economy is well defined. As such, various
game-theoretic solutions with and without symmetric information can be applied.
We show that the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations coincides with
the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations when information is symmetric. The
set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of rational
expectations equilibrium allocations when information is asymmetric. These re-
sults are useful for analyzing and refining Walrasian and rational expectations
equilibrium allocations.
xi
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Chapter 1
Capital in Transition: Housing
and Sectoral Reallocation in the
Long Run
1.1 Introduction
Developed economies have experienced a sectoral reallocation of capital over
the course of their long-run economic development. The share of housing cap-
ital has grown annually by approximately 0.2 percent for the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Canada, and the United States since 1700.1 While the sectoral
1The decomposition of domestic capital follows [28]. Domestic capital is broken down into
three categories: agricultural land, housing (including residential structure and land value),
and nonresidential capital (including non-residential structure, equipment and machinery, and
intellectual property products). From here on, the share of housing capital is defined as the
share of value of housing capital out of the sum of value of non-residential and housing capital.
1
reallocation of capital happens gradually in these five developed economies, it has
been rapid in China. Since the housing market reform in the 1980s, the share of
housing capital in China has increased by 1.5 percent annually.2
The question I address in this paper is whether standard neoclassical growth
theory can qualitatively and quantitatively explain the features of the sectoral re-
allocation of capital not only for developed economies but also for China. I begin
by documenting the empirical regularities regarding the share of housing capital
across developed economies and China. Alongside the different annual growth
rate of the share of housing capital, another salient difference between the two
types of economies is the correlation between the share of housing capital and the
consumption-output ratio. On the one hand, the share of housing capital is posi-
tively correlated with the consumption-output ratio across developed economies,
but on the other hand the correlation between the two variables has been nega-
tive in China since 1987. While there are many institutional differences between
developed economies and China, I start with a simple framework to investigate
the factors that determine the observed differences. I find that in a standard two-
sector neoclassical growth framework, the distinction between two key parameters,
the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and the capital intensity of
production of the housing sector, can explain the differences observed in the two
types of economies.
2See Section 1.2 for a detailed discussion of the empirical regularities of sectoral allocation
of capital.
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I build a two-sector general equilibrium model with housing and non-residential
sectors. The model features preferences with a constant elasticity of substitution
between the two sectors, and Cobb-Douglas production technologies within each
sector. The two types of capital are treated symmetrically and are endowed with
dual functions: each unit of capital can be used as a factor input of production and
a capital good that generates a rental return. In a frictionless environment, the
equilibrium allocation features a balanced growth path with a constant sectoral
allocation of capital between the two sectors. During the transitional dynamics,
the correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output
ratio is determined by the interplay of the elasticity of substitution between the
two sectors and the capital intensities of production of the two sectors.
Calibrating the model to the United States and China, I examine whether the
dynamics proposed by the model are consistent with empirical observations. With
plausible parameters, the model generates reallocations that are consistent with
the experiences of the United States and China. Moreover, the model can account
for (on the one hand) the positive correlation between the share of housing capital
and the consumption-output ratio in the United States, and (on the other hand)
the negative correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-
output ratio in China. In particular, the rapid increase in the share of housing
capital and the decrease in the consumption-output ratio observed in China can
be explained by a combination of three factors: a high elasticity of substitution
3
between housing and non-residential sectors, a high capital intensity of production
of the housing sector, and a low initial share of housing capital before the Chinese
housing market reform.
To the extent that the model can reproduce the key features of the data in
China, I apply the model to quantify the effect of the initial share of housing
capital before the housing market reform on the Chinese economy. Given that
there was no market for housing before the reform in the mid-1980s, the initial
sectoral allocation when the market mechanism starts to work is a key factor to
study the Chinese economy. When changing the Chinese sectoral capital allocation
in 1987 to the US level of a comparable development stage, the comparative study
suggests that the initial low share of housing capital before the housing market
reform has led to an over-investment in housing, and an under-investment in non-
residential capital since 1987 in China.
This paper makes four main contributions to the literature on structural change
and housing. First, this paper highlights the role of the share of capital in the pro-
cess of structural change, complementing the existing structural change literature
that focuses on labor reallocation ([24], [27] and [6]3). The model of [1] features
both capital and labor reallocation between sectors with differentiated capital in-
3[24] study the structural change in production through labor reallocation using a nonhomo-
thetic preference that features different income elasticities of demand among different sectors;
[27] use a preference with constant elasticity of substitution and defines the structural change
as a change in labor share; [6] investigate the role of agricultural productivity on the economic
growth and sectoral allocation of labor and production for China’s post-reform economy, using
a two-sector model with nonhomothetic preferences and Cobb-Douglas production functions.
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tensities of production, but does not consider the housing service consumption
in the utility function. Building on the theory of [1], this paper stresses a novel
mechanism to explain the different patterns of the correlation between the share
of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio.
Second, this paper characterizes the transitional dynamics of sectoral alloca-
tion of capital. The model inherits the features of home production models where
housing service consumption enters the preferences as an object of interest ([3],
[20] and [11]). While most of the literature focuses on the business cycle prop-
erties of housing, few discuss long-term trends and the transitional dynamics of
capital allocation along with the impact they have on economic development. A
growing body of literature studies the effect of financial market liberalization on
the acceleration of capital reallocation to the housing sector ([15], [23], and [32]).
This literature features a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents under an
incomplete market environment. These models omit the supply side of housing
capital. Also, the numerical solution procedure might obscure certain economic
mechanisms. This paper complements the literature by studying the long-term
trend of capital allocation with transitional dynamics and their macroeconomic
implications.
Third, this paper provides a theoretical framework to study the correlation
between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio. The
spillover effect of housing wealth on consumption growth is well studied by the
5
empirical literature ([7], [17] and [22]). It is empirically shown that changes in
housing wealth have a larger impact than changes in other financial assets in in-
fluencing household consumption. While data confirm the higher contemporary
correlation between housing wealth and consumption, the causal relationship be-
tween housing wealth accumulation and consumption/saving motive is not clear.
This paper proposes using the share of housing capital to study the interaction
between the housing wealth and household consumption.
Last, this paper develops a unified theory to explain different empirical pat-
terns across developed economies and China within the neoclassical growth frame-
work. In the literature, the models applied to study developed economies and
China are separated given the different empirical observations ([18] and [8]). This
paper calibrates a standard two-sector neoclassical growth model to both the
United States and China, and showcases the model’s ability to reproduce the fea-
tures that are consistent with both the United States and China. By providing a
comparative perspective of the study of China with that of developed economies,
this paper justifies the applicability of neoclassical growth theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the empirical
regularities regarding the sectoral allocation of capital across developed economies
and China. Section 3 describes the model environment. Section 4 presents the
model calibration to the United States. Section 5 presents the calibration to
China. Section 6 draws conclusions.
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1.2 Empirical Regularities of Sectoral Allocation
of Capital
In this section, I document three major features regarding the share of housing
capital across countries. First, I show that there is a consistent decline over time
in the value of agricultural land, which is accompanied by a rise in the value of
housing and non-residential capital. Second, I demonstrate a positive correlation
between GDP per capita and the share of housing capital in the United States and
China. Finally, I show that the correlation between the share of housing capital
and the consumption-output ratio is positive across developed economies, but is
negative in recent decades in China.
1.2.1 Structural Transformation of Capital and Share of
Housing Capital
Figure 1.1 shows that in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada,
and the United States, the total value of capital, measured as a fraction of na-
tional income, has not changed much over time, but that the capital structure
has been transformed: the value of land has gradually been replaced by the value
of non-residential and housing capital.4 In contrast, China experienced the same
structural transformation of capital within a short period of 30 years.
4More precisely, the capital-output ratio presents a U-shaped pattern for the United King-
dom, France, Germany, and Canada due to WWII. For the United States, the U-Shaped pattern
is less strong.
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Table 1.1: Share of Housing Capital out of Total Value of Capital
1700 1800 1900 2000 2010
UK 0.333 0.287 0.386 0.404 0.555
FRA 0.437 0.416 0.412 0.568 0.610
GER 0.227 0.345 0.581 0.621
USA 0.340 0.291 0.415 0.400
CAN 0.276 0.361 0.568 0.610
1987 1994 2001 2008 2013
China 0.303 0.220 0.314 0.340 0.458
Data Sources:
Computed using non-residential capital and housing from [28] for the five developed
economies; from Table 1.13 for China.
Table 1.1 summaries the evolution of the share of housing capital across the
five developed economies since 1700, and in China between 1987 and 2013. As
shown in the table, China has experienced a rapid increase in the share of housing
capital since 1987. The percentage increase of the share of housing capital within
30 years in China is at the same level with that of the United States over a hundred
years during the 20th century.
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1.2.2 GDP Per Capita vs. Share of Housing Capital
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show that the share of housing capital is positively corre-
lated with GDP per capita. This is true for China during its 30-year transition
and the United States throughout its longer-term transition. The correlation is
insignificant for the US economy from 1950 to 2011, consistent with the notion
that the postwar US economy is on a “balanced growth path”.
1.2.3 Share of Housing Capital vs. Consumption-Output
Ratio
Figure 1.4 documents an unconditional correlation between the average share
of housing capital and the average consumption-output ratio between 1995 and
2013 for OECD countries. There is a significant positive correlation between the
share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio across OECD countries.
When looking at the correlation between the two variables for the postwar US
economy as shown in Figure 1.5 (b), the positive correlation remains.
However, during the 30-year transition in China, the correlation between the
share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio becomes negative. As
shown in Figure 1.5 (a), the time-series plot of the unconditional correlation be-
tween the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio present a
significant negative correlation.
9
The three empirical regularities regarding the share of housing capital point to
three facts. First, the share of housing capital positively correlates with the income
of an economy in transition. Second, the growth rate at which the share of housing
capital increases has been dramatically different between developed economies and
China. Lastly, the consumption-output ratio is negatively correlated with the
share of housing capital in China, which contrasts with the positive relationship
seen in the developed economies.
1.3 The Model
In this section, I present the neoclassical growth model environment, a two-
sector model with exogenous technological progress. Capital and labor (re)allocation
on both the balanced growth path and the transitional dynamics are characterized.
1.3.1 The Environment
The model economy is infinite horizon. Time is discrete. There is a represen-
tative household with preferences given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, st) (1.1)
where c is the consumption of non-residential goods and services, s is the consump-
tion of housing services, and β is the utility discount factor. Labor is supplied
inelastically and normalized to one. The instantaneous utility function combines
10
the two types of consumption with a constant elasticity of substitution  ∈ [0,∞):
u(c, s) =
[
(ηc
−1
 + (1− η)s −1 ) −1
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ
where η ∈ (0, 1) indicates the preference weight between the two types of con-
sumption; and 1
σ
∈ [0,∞) denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.5
Final output in the two sectors are produced with the following production
functions:
yt = k
αk
t (zt(1− lt))1−αk , st = hαht (ztlt)1−αh (1.2)
where y and s denote the production of the non-residential sector and the housing
sector respectively; k and h denote the factor inputs of capital in the two sectors
respectively; 1 is the household’s normalized time endowment, and l denotes the
share of labor allocated to the housing sector. αk 6= αh denote the capital in-
tensities of production of the two sectors, and z represents the labor-augmenting
technological progress, which evolves according to zt = z0 · At, for A > 1 and
z0 ≥ 1.
Non-residential capital and housing evolve as follows:
kt+1 = kt(1− δk) + ikt, 0 < δk < 1 (1.3)
and
ht+1 = ht(1− δh) + iht, 0 < δh < 1 (1.4)
5Note that the CES instantaneous utility function is a homothetic preference, which implicitly
assumes that the income elasticity of both types of consumption equals to one. In this paper,
different income elasticities of demand between sectors are not considered.
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where ik and ih are the non-residential and housing investment, δk and δh denote
the depreciation rate for non-residential capital and housing respectively. Denote
a = k + h as the aggregate capital stock. Assume that δk = δh. The aggregate
resource constraint is:
ct + at+1 ≤ yt + (1− δ)at (1.5)
which requires consumption and investment to be less than output of the non-
residential sector.
1.3.2 The Competitive Equilibrium and the Social Plan-
ner’s Problem
Normalize the price of the consumption of non-residential goods and services
to one. Denote the rental price of capital and the wage rate by R and w, and
the interest rate by r. Let q denote the relative price of housing services. Define
the share of housing capital as κ = h
a
, and the share of labor allocated to the
housing sector as l. A competitive equilibrium is defined as the paths of prices
(Rt, wt, rt, qt)t≥0, the factor allocations (lt, κt)t≥0, and the consumption and stock
holding decisions (ct, st, at+1)t≥0 such that:
(a) Given the aggregate state (at, zt)t≥0 and the paths of prices (Rt, wt, qt)t≥0,
firms choose the factor allocations (lit, κit)t≥0, for i ∈ {k, h}, to maximize profits
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at each period t:
max
lkt,κkt
{
(κktat)
αk(ztlkt)
1−αk −Rt · (κktat)− wt · lkt
}
and
max
lht,κht
{
qt · (κhtat)αh(ztlht)1−αh −Rt · (κhtat)− wt · lht
}
(b) Given the initial endowment of capital stock a0 and the paths of prices
(rt, wt, qt)t≥0, the household makes the consumption and saving decision (ct, st, at+1)t≥0
to maximize the lifetime utility of (1.1):6
max
{ct,st,at+1}t≥0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, st)
s.t.
ct + qtst + at+1 ≤ (1 + rt)at + wt
(c) All the markets clear s.t.
ct + at+1 = (κktat)
αk(ztlkt)
1−αk + (1− δ)at
st = (κhtat)
αh(ztlht)
1−αh
lkt + lht = 1
κkt + κht = 1
Since markets are complete and competitive, the Second Welfare Theorem
can be applied. The competitive equilibrium can be characterized by solving a
6Note that without aggregate uncertainty, the rate of return on both types of capital are the
same. Hence, there is only one effective capital asset market that pools both types of capital
together with a single rate of return.
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social planner’s problem: Given the state variables {z, k, h}, the factor allocations
{l, k′, h′} are chosen to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
v (k, h, z) = max
l,k′,h′
u (c, s) + βv (k′, h′, z′)
s.t.
c+ k′ + h′ = kαk(z(1− l))1−αk + (1− δ)(k + h)
s = hαh(zl)1−αh
Once the solution is characterized, the competitive factor prices (R,w, r) and
the factor allocations (l, κ) can be backed out. In particular, the relative price for
housing services can be derived as:
q =
us
uc
=
1− η
η
·
(c
s
)1

(1.6)
1.3.3 The Balanced Growth Path
Detrend the real variables by the growth rate of the economy, A. Denote
xˆt =
xt
At
, for xt = {yt, ct, at, st}. In equilibrium, the equalization of the marginal
product of capital and labor in both sectors within a period implies:
kˆ
hˆ
=
αk(1− αh)
αh(1− αk) ·
1− l
l
(1.7)
Denote the rate of return on non-residential capital and housing as rk = αk ·
yˆ
kˆ
− δ and rh = αh · qsˆhˆ − δ, respectively. The no-arbitrage condition rk = rh = r
14
implies kˆ
hˆ
= αk
αh
· yˆ
qsˆ
, which indicates that the capital allocation depends on the
relative value of final outputs in both sectors. Substituting q = us
uc
in (1.6),
kˆ
hˆ
=
αk
αh
· η
1− η ·
(
yˆ
sˆ
)1−1/
·
(
yˆ
cˆ
)1/
(1.8)
Combining (1.7) and (1.8),
κ =
{
1 +
αk
αh
· η
1− η ·
(
yˆ
sˆ
)1−1/
·
(
yˆ
cˆ
)1/}−1
(1.9)
and
l =
{
1 +
αh
αk
· 1− αk
1− αh ·
1− κ
κ
}−1
(1.10)
Equations (1.9) and (1.10) imply the share of housing capital and the share of
labor allocated to the housing sector in equilibrium. In particular, (1.10) shows
that at each period, the share of labor allocated to the housing sector is monoton-
ically increasing in the share of housing capital. In other words, labor and capital
are always reallocated towards the same sector in equilibrium.
Dynamics of the economy are determined by the capital accumulation and the
Euler equation. The capital accumulation implies:
(
aˆ′
yˆ′
)
· A = (1− δ) · aˆ
yˆ
+ 1− cˆ
yˆ
(1.11)
The Euler equation implies:
uc
u′c
= βA−σ
[
αk
1− κ′ ·
(
aˆ′
yˆ′
)−1
+ 1− δ
]
(1.12)
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where uc = η · [ηcˆ
−1
 + (1− η)sˆ −1 ]
1−σ
−1 · cˆ−1 .7
A balanced growth path of the economy is defined as an equilibrium trajectory,
along which the share of housing capital and the share of labor allocated to the
housing sector stay constant, and all the real variables {yt, ct, st, at} grow at the
same rate.
Proposition 1: Assume that Aσ > β
[
αkA + (1 − αk)(1 − δ)
]
. There exists a
unique balanced growth path, along which the steady-state capital per capita is:
aˆ∗ = z0 ·
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
] 1
1−αk · αh(1− αk)
αh(1− αk)(1− κ∗) + αk(1− αh)κ∗ (1.13)
and the steady-state share of housing capital is:
κ∗ =
1− n(Θ)
1 +m(Θ)
(1.14)
where Θ = {αk, αh, A, δ, η, , β} is a set of fundamental parameters, n(·) and m(·)
are both functions of the fundamental parameters of the economy. Along the bal-
anced growth path, all the real variables {yt, ct, st, at} grow at the growth rate of
technological progress, A.
Proposition 1 implies that the steady-state share of housing capital depends
only on the fundamental parameters of the economy, whereas the steady-state cap-
7See Appendix 1.7.1 for an alternative derivation of the equilibrium conditions (1.7), (1.8) and
(2.7) from FOCs of the dynamic programming problem. For all the propositions, see Appendix
1.7.2 for detailed proofs.
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ital per capita is jointly determined by the labor-augmented technological progress
and the capital allocation of the economy. The next two propositions demonstrate
how the fundamental parameters and technological progress impact the steady-
state share of housing capital and capital per capita.
Proposition 2: The steady-state share of housing capital, κ∗, is:
(1) increasing in the preference weight of the housing service consumption, i.e.,
dκ∗
d(1−η) > 0;
(2) increasing in the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e., dκ
∗
dσ
> 0;
(3) increasing in the elasticity of substitution between the two types of consump-
tion when the preference weight of the housing service consumption is sufficiently
large, i.e., dκ
∗
d
> 0, for η ∈
(
0, 1
1+ω(Θ)
)
where ω(·) is a function of fundamental
parameters of the economy.
Proposition 3: The steady-state capital per capita, aˆ∗, is:
(1) increasing in the level of labor-augmented technological progress, i.e., daˆ
∗
dz0
> 0;
(2) decreasing in the growth rate of labor-augmented technological progress, i.e.,
daˆ∗
dA
< 0.
(3) decreasing in the steady-state share of housing capital if the production of the
housing sector is labor intensive, i.e., daˆ
∗
dκ∗ < 0 if αk > αh.
(4) increasing in the steady-state share of housing capital if the production of the
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housing sector is capital intensive, i.e., daˆ
∗
dκ∗ > 0 if αk < αh.
While the first two comparative statics in Proposition 3 are consistent with
the one-sector neoclassical growth model, the last two statements have not been
discussed by the one-sector model. It implies that the sectoral allocation of capital
and the capital intensities of production of the two sectors determine the capital
accumulation of an economy. In particular, in an economy where the production
of the housing sector is labor intensive, a higher steady-state share of housing
capital implies a lower investment-output ratio, i.e., a higher consumption-output
ratio at steady state.8 In an economy where the production of the housing sector
is capital intensive, a higher steady-state share of housing capital implies a higher
investment-output ratio, i.e., a lower consumption-output ratio at steady state.
1.3.4 The Transitional Dynamics
During the transitional dynamics, the correlation between the share of housing
capital and the consumption-output ratio is determined by the interplay of the
elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and the capital intensities of
production of the two sectors.
8This is because the steady-state capital per capita is determined when the actual invest-
ment per capita is equal to the break-even investment per capita, as discussed in a one-sector
neoclassical growth model. A higher share of housing capital κ∗ decreases the actual investment
level without changing the break-even investment, leading to a higher capital per capita, a lower
investment-output ratio and a higher consumption-output ratio at steady state.
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Proposition 4: During the transitional dynamics, with capital deepening, if
the production of the housing sector is labor (capital) intensive, i.e., αk > αh
(αk < αh), the share of housing capital increases, as the consumption-output ra-
tio increases (decreases).
The mechanism behind the correlation between the share of housing capital
and the consumption-output ratio lies in the return on housing capital. The no-
arbitrage condition (1.8) implies that the rate of return on housing capital is always
equal to that on non-residential capital. Consider the case when the production of
the housing sector is labor intensive. As capital deepens, the relative output of the
housing sector decreases. An increase in the return on housing capital induces a
simultaneous increase in the share of housing capital and the consumption-output
ratio. Otherwise, an opportunity to arbitrage can emerge.
1.4 Calibration: US (1948-2005)
In this section, I calibrate the model to the US postwar economy, and examine
whether the dynamics generated by the model are consistent with the US data.
Further, I investigate the effect of a lower initial share of housing capital on the
economy. The benchmark calibration captures the key features of the US economy
between 1948 and 2005, and the positive correlation between the share of housing
capital and the consumption-output ratio is robust with respect to different values
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of parameters and the lower initial share of housing capital. But, the levels of
the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio are sensitive to
the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, and the numerical exercise
suggests that the initial share of housing capital has a large impact on the speed
of sectoral reallocation and the investment structure of the economy.
1.4.1 Data
The measure of the flow variables of the model is from NIPA. In particular,
the output of the non-residential sector includes the consumption of nondurable
goods and services, the non-residential investment and the housing investment.
The output of the housing sector is from the household expenditure on housing and
utilities. Non-residential and housing capital are from the Fixed Assets Table.9
Labor in the non-residential sector is computed as the total hours worked by
the full-time and part-time workers in the private sector, divided by the total
numbers of workers and hours in a year for normalization.10 In addition, I refer
to the current-price data as value, and the chain-type fixed-price quantity indices
as quantity.
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Table 1.2: Summary of Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source/Target
Taken from the literature
β 0.96 Utility discount factor Standard value
σ 1.00∗ Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution Standard value
Estimated from the data
δ 0.06 Depreciation rate of capital NIPA Table 1.5 and
Fixed Assets Table 2.1
αk 0.30 Capital intensity of production NIPA Table 6.2
of the non-residential sector
 1.81* Elasticity of substitution between OLS regression in (1.15)
the two types of consumption
A 1.0149 Growth rate of the labor-augmented Growth accounting
technological progress
Calibrated in the model
αh 0.10 Capital intensity of production Ratio of hours labor and leisure in 1948
of the housing sector ((1− l)/l)
η 0.28 Preference weight of the consumption Ratio of non-residential and housing capital
of nondurable goods and services in 1948 (k/h)
z0 10 Initial value of the labor-augmented Relative output of non-residential sector
technological progress in 1948 (y/s)
Note: parameters with ∗ will be varied for the robustness check.
1.4.2 Calibration
The frequency of the model is annual. The model economy is fully charac-
terized by 8 parameters, β, δ, αk, αh, A, , η, σ, and three initial values, z0, a0
9Data from [11] are used for result comparison, in which the market value for housing includes
both the value for land and residential structure, whereas the data from Fixed Assets Table only
includes the value for residential structure. The results remain robust using data from [11].
10Labors are taken from the private sector because the output does not include the government
expenditures.
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and κ0. Table 1.2 summarizes the model parameters. First, I adopt the standard
parameter values for β = 0.96 and σ = 1. Then, I estimate δ, αk, A and  as
follows:
δk = δh = 0.06. Using the capital accumulation equation (1.3) in the model
and data for the real non-residential capital, I back out a series of the implied
depreciation rates of non-residential capital 1− (k′− ik)/k. The value reported is
an average over the sample. The depreciation rate on housing capital is calculated
in a similar way.
αk = 0.30. The labor income share of GNP net of housing services is about
70 percent during the sample period between 1948 and 2005. Hence, the capital
intensity of production of the non-residential sector is chosen to be 0.30.
A = 1.0149. The labor-augmented technological progress is estimated through
the growth accounting equation below for the sample period between 1948 and
2005.
log z = 1
1−αk log y −
αk
1−αk log k − log l
The average growth rate of the technological progress is estimated to be 1.0149.
 = 1.81. Equation (1.6) suggests a way to evaluate the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the two types of consumption:
log
cvalue
svalue
= log
η
1− η +
− 1

log
cquantity
squantity
(1.15)
Hence, the coefficient −1

can be estimated by regressing the log ratio of the nom-
inal expenditure value between the two sectors on the log ratio of the quantities
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between the two sectors. The regression yields an estimate of  = 1.81, with a
two standard error coefficient interval of [1.64, 2].
The remaining parameters that need to be assigned values are αh and η. Equa-
tion (1.7) is referred to evaluate the capital intensity of production of the housing
sector, using the ratio of hours for labor and leisure and the ratio of non-residential
and housing capital in 1948 (t = 0 in the model). Further, (1.8) is referred to
evaluate the preference weight between the two types of consumption to match
the ratio of non-residential and housing capital, the consumption-output ratio,
and the relative output ratio between the two sectors in 1948. For the initial
values, I set κ0 = 0.4817, which corresponds to the share of housing capital in
1948. aˆ0 = 10 and z0 = 10 are jointly chosen to match the range of the relative
output ratio between the two sectors.11
Table 1.3 presents the comparison between the US data and the benchmark
calibration. The first two rows show that the benchmark calibration is consistent
with the allocation of capital and labor between the two sectors. In particular, the
calibration matches the following feature of the data: capital is evenly allocated
between the two sectors, and there is a slight reallocation of both capital and
labor towards the housing sector between 1948 and 2005. The last two rows show
that the benchmark calibration generates the increase in the consumption-output
ratio and the relative output of the housing sector. Although the levels are slightly
11In fact, the choice of aˆ0 and z0 provides degree of freedom of the calibration. The dynamics
is sensitive to the choice of the two initial conditions, and aˆ0 = 10 and z0 = 10 is the pair that
better matches the US data between 1948 and 2005, among all the attempted trials.
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Table 1.3: Data and Benchmark Calibration, 1948 - 2005
Benchmark
US Data Calibration
1948 2005 1948 2005
κ 0.4817 0.4949 0.4817 0.5008
l 0.7740 0.8063 0.7819 0.7946
c/y 0.6710 0.7041 0.5092 0.6159
s/y 0.1506 0.2226 0.1579 0.1653
Note: US Data from NIPA. Calibration described in the text.
different, the increasing trend in both variables are captured by the benchmark
calibration.
Table 1.4: Data and Model Calibration, 1948-2005 (Robustness)
Model Model Model
US Data  = 1.64  = 2.52  = 3.70
1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005
κ 0.4817 0.4949 0.4817 0.4947 0.4817 0.5988 0.4817 0.7101
l 0.7740 0.8063 0.7819 0.7771 0.7819 0.8520 0.7819 0.9043
c/y 0.6710 0.7041 0.5333 0.6349 0.3555 0.5222 0.2044 0.3377
s/y 0.1506 0.2226 0.1684 0.1488 0.1684 0.1949 0.1684 0.2640
Note: US Data from NIPA. Calibration described in the text.
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For the robustness check, I consider different values in the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, the growth rate of the economy, and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two sectors.12 While results with different σ and A are
similar to the benchmark calibration, the one with different  in Table 1.4 shows
that while the positive correlation between the share of housing capital and the
consumption-output ratio is robust with respect to different elasticities of substi-
tution, a higher elasticity of substitution between the two sectors leads to a higher
share of housing capital and a lower consumption-output ratio.
To summarize, the calibration indicates that the model can generate dynamics
that are consistent with the US data. It matches the allocation of capital and
labor, as well as the positive correlation between the share of housing capital
and the consumption-output ratio. The robustness check shows that the positive
correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio
is robust, but the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors impacts the
levels of the two variables.
1.4.3 Initial Conditions
To the extent that the model can reproduce the US data, I investigate the
effect of the initial sectoral capital allocation on the economy.13 In particular, I
12See Appendix 1.7.3 for a detailed discussion on the robustness check.
13This is because among all the institutional differences between the United States and China,
an important one is that when the market mechanism starts to work in China, the share of
housing capital in China is low as shown in 1.13.
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consider the counterfactual experiment of starting the calibrated US economy with
half of the initial share of housing capital, and examine whether it can explain the
negative correlation of the share of housing capital and the consumption-output
ratio observed in China.
Table 1.5 shows that the positive correlation between the share of housing
capital and the consumption-output ratio remains. But the lower initial share
of housing capital decreases the relative output of the housing sector during the
transition. Moreover, the lower initial share of housing capital has a large impact
on the speed of the sectoral reallocation, the relative price of housing services and
the investment structure as shown in Figure 1.6.
Table 1.5: Data, Benchmark Calibration and Counterfactual Experiment
US Data Benchmark Counterfactual
Calibration Experiment
1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005
κ 0.4817 0.4949 0.4817 0.5008 0.2409 0.5008
l 0.7740 0.8063 0.7819 0.7946 0.5503 0.7946
c/y 0.6710 0.7041 0.5092 0.6159 0.3699 0.6159
s/y 0.1506 0.2226 0.1579 0.1653 0.0650 0.1653
Note: US Data from NIPA. Calibration and counterfactual experiment described in the
text.
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When the economy starts at half of the initial share of housing capital of the
benchmark calibration, Figure 1.6 shows that compared to the benchmark case,
the share of housing capital experiences a rapid increase during the transitional
dynamics. It increases to a level that is higher than the steady-state value first,
and then gradually falls back to the steady-state value. Further, the relative price
of housing services jumps to a high level, and gradually fall down during the
transitional dynamics. Compared to the benchmark, the economy that starts at
half of the initial share of housing capital present a different investment structure:
non-residential investment-output ratio experiences a large drop, while the housing
investment-output ratio experiences a large leap.
In summary, the result from this numerical exercise shows that the positive
correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio
is robust with respect to a lower initial share of housing capital. But, the initial
share of housing capital has a large impact on the speed of sectoral reallocation
of capital, the relative price of housing services and the investment structure of
the economy. Compared to the benchmark case, the economy that starts at half
of the initial share of housing capital experiences a rapid increase in the share of
housing capital, a higher level of relative price of housing services and a different
investment structure during the transitional dynamics.
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1.5 Calibration: China (1987-2013)
In section 1.4, I showed that the elasticity of substitution between the two
sectors and the initial share of housing capital have significant impacts on the
dynamics of the economy, but neither different values in the elasticity of substi-
tution nor the initial share of housing capital can explain the negative correlation
between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio observed
in China. In this section, I calibrate the model to the Chinese economy between
1987 and 2013. I find that to match the negative correlation between the share of
housing capital and the consumption-output ratio observed in the Chinese data, it
requires a capital intensive production of the housing sector (αk < αh). Further,
I quantify the effect of initial share of housing capital before the housing market
reform on the Chinese economy during its 30-year transition.
1.5.1 Background Introduction and Data
In order to conduct a similar calibration exercise for China as the one for the
US, I construct a dataset for capital stock in China. In particular, I choose the
year 1987 as the initial period of the dataset. Based on the strand of literature
that studies the Chinese housing market, I summarize the facts related to the
housing market reform with respect to the following time frame, which justifies
the reason for choosing 1987 as the initial period.
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Pre-1978: Government established public ownership over all new housing
stock. Housing was not a commodity, and urban households had little choices in
housing consumption, which was provided by the government for a highly sub-
sidized rental charge. In particular, housing investment was seriously neglected
during the economic and political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s. By 1978, per
capita housing floor space was only 3.6 square meters.14
1979-1987: Reforms of the housing system started in 1979. The aim of the
reform is to decentralize the housing investment. The decentralization led the
housing investment as a proportion of GNP to rise from an average of 1.5 percent
before reform to over 7 percent during the 1980s. As a result, per capita housing
floor space rose to 5.2 square meters by 1985.15
Post-1987: In 1988, the Chinese government endorsed private property rights
in urban land, and long-term land leases were granted for private real estate
development. The housing construction has grown rapidly since then. In 1996,
housing accounted for 86 percent of the building floor area sold. Since 1997,
the housing investment has been high compared with that in other countries.
Until 2012, per capita housing floor space has improved to 32.7 square meters
and the housing investment accounts for about 15 percent of the total fixed asset
investment in China.16
14See [34], [16] and [36].
15See [33], [13] and [36].
16See [21], [37] and [8].
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Since the large scale of housing construction started after the Chinese gov-
ernment policy at the end of 1987, I choose the year 1987 as the initial period
for the dataset. Data for the consumption of nondurable goods and services, the
non-residential investment and the housing investment are from China Statistical
Yearbook (CSY). A drawback of CSY is the lack of the categorized consumption
data for the total population, with only the categorized consumption for per ur-
ban capita. To get a consistent measure, all the variables are in the unit of per
urban capita, computed through dividing all the variables for urban population
by the size of urban population.17
1.5.2 Calibration
Table 1.6 summarizes the parameters. For the calibration exercise for China,
I take the parameter values β = 0.96, σ = 1 and δ = 0.08.18 Since there is no
available hours worked for labor in China, the growth accounting for the growth
rate of the labor-augmented technological progress cannot be conducted for China.
For the benchmark calibration in China, I choose A = 1.04, leaving other possible
values for A for the robustness check.
17CSY Data for the urban investment of total fixed assets starts from 1995. For the missing
years between 1987 and 1994, data are estimated by 78% (1995 fraction) of the investment of
total fixed assets; CSY Data for the urban investment for residential buildings starts from 1995.
For the missing years between 1987 and 1994, data are estimated by 20% (1995 fraction) of the
urban investment of total fixed assets; CSY Data for the urban consumption per capita miss
the years 1991-1994, 1996-1999, and 2001-2009. For the missing years, data are estimated by
interpolation.
18The depreciation rate is from [4], implying the useful lives of the capital stock is about 12
years.
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Table 1.6: Summary of Parameters
Parameter Value (China) Value (US) Source/Target
Taken from the literature or by assumption
β 0.96 0.96 Standard value
σ 1.00 1.00 Standard value
δ 0.08 0.06 [4]
A 1.0400* 1.0149 By assumption
η 0.28 0.28 By assumption
αk 0.30 0.30 By assumption
Estimated from the data
 3.70* 1.81 OLS regression in (1.15)
Calibrated in the model
αh 0.50* 0.10 Consumption-output ratio
z0 5 10 Relative output of housing sector
Note: The growth rate A is a parameter left for robustness check.
To estimate the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, I follow the
same approach for the US, by regressing the log ratio of nominal expenditure
value between the two sectors on the log ratio of the quantities between the two
sectors.19The estimation for the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors
is 3.70, with a two standard error coefficient interval [2.86, 5.26]. Compared with
 = 1.81 in the US (with a two standard error coefficient interval [1.64, 2]), the
estimation indicates a more substitutable preference between the two sector for
Chinese households.
19The nominal values are obtained from CSY. For quantities, I divide the nominal values by
the price indices by categories in CSY, of which the available years are from 2001 to 2013.
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Given that there is no labor-capital composition of national income in CSY as
in NIPA, the calibration strategy is different for the capital intensities of produc-
tion of both sectors and the preference weight between the two sectors, i.e., αk,
αh and η. For the benchmark calibration, I assume that the preference weight be-
tween the two types of consumption for Chinese households is the same with that
for US households, i.e. η = 0.28. To match the negative correlation between the
share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio, the capital intensity
of production of the housing sector is set to be αh = 0.50 if assuming the capital
intensity of production of the non-residential sector is the same with that of the
US at αk = 0.30.
Table 1.7: Benchmark Calibration
China Data Benchmark Calibration
1987 2013 1987 2013
κ 0.3035 0.4580 0.3035 0.8703
c/y 0.3489 0.1985 0.5479 0.3230
s/y 0.0505 0.0390 0.0582 0.8411
Note: China Data from CSY(2014). Calibration described in the text.
Table 1.7 presents the benchmark calibration of China. It shows that the
benchmark calibration generates the negative correlation between the share of
housing capital and the consumption-output ratio in the data, although it does
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not match the level of both variables, given the potential issue of missing data.
Meanwhile, the benchmark calibration captures the rapid increase in the share of
housing capital as shown in Figure 1.7.
To summarize, I present a benchmark calibration for China between 1987 and
2013. The benchmark calibration assumes that the preference weight between
the two types of consumption for Chinese households and the capital intensity of
production of the non-residential sector are the same with the US economy. With
a high elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, a high capital intensity
of production of the housing sector and a low initial share of housing capital, the
calibration accounts for the fast-growing share of housing capital, and the negative
correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio
between 1987 and 2013 in China.
1.5.3 Initial Sectoral Allocation
To the extent that the calibration can reproduce the key feature of the Chinese
data, I apply the model to quantify the effect of the initial share of housing capital
in 1987 on the Chinese economy. The approach is to compare two calibrated
economies, one started with the share of housing capital at the China level in
1987, and the other started with the share of housing capital at the US level of a
comparable development stage.20
20To be specific, both economies are calibrated to China.
33
In order to find an appropriate development stage in the US economy to refer
to, I resample the US data between 1930 and 2013, using a moving block bootstrap
approach proposed by [29]. I find that China in 1987 is most close to the United
States in 1956, when using the joint correlation of the consumption-output ratio,
the non-residential capital-output ratio, and the housing capital-output ratio as a
measure of resemblance.21
Consider the two calibrated economies, one started with the share of housing
capital at the US level in 1956 (κ0 = 0.47), and the other started with the share of
housing capital at the China level in 1987 (κ0 = 0.30). Figure 1.8 shows the effect
of raising the initial share of housing capital from the China level in 1987 to the US
level in 1956 on the economy. The transitional dynamics for the non-residential
investment-output ratio, the housing investment-output ratio, the relative output
of the housing sector, and the relative price of housing services are compared. It
is notable that the investment structure is strongly affected by the initial sectoral
allocation of capital as shown in panel (a) and (b). This is because the low initial
share of housing capital at the China level in 1987 raises the marginal return on
the housing investment. An implication of Figure 1.8 is that the resources that
should have been allocated to the non-residential sector are induced to housing
during the 30-year transition in China.
Table 1.8 quantifies the impact of the initial share of housing capital at the
China level in 1987 on the economy. It shows that when changing the initial share
21See the Appendix 1.9 for a statistical comparison between the US economy and China.
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Table 1.8: China Benchmark vs. the US allocation
s/y ik/y ih/y q
China benchmark (κ0 = 0.30) 0.1331 0.2493 0.3113 5.0176
US allocation (κ0 = 0.47) 0.1482 0.3063 0.2611 4.6506
of housing capital from the China level in 1987 to the US level in 1956, the mean
relative output of the housing sector and the mean non-residential investment-
output ratio increase by 11.3 percent and 22.9 percent respectively. The mean
housing investment-output ratio and the mean relative price of housing services
decrease by 16.1 percent and 10 percent respectively. These numbers suggest
that the initial low share of housing capital might lead to an over-investment in
housing, an under-investment in non-residential capital, and a higher relative price
of housing services during its 30-year transition in China.
1.6 Conclusion
I propose a two-sector general equilibrium model to study the sectoral alloca-
tion of capital between housing and nonresidential sector in a neoclassical growth
environment. The model features preferences with a constant elasticity of substi-
tution between the two sectors, and Cobb-Douglas production technologies within
each sector. The equilibrium dynamics of the model imply that the elasticity of
35
substitution between the two sectors and the capital intensities of production of
the two sectors hold the key to understanding the correlation between the sectoral
capital allocation and the consumption-output ratio.
Calibrated to the United States and China, the model can account for the
positive correlation between the share of housing capital and the consumption-
output ratio in the United States on the one hand, and the negative correlation
between the share of housing capital and the consumption-output ratio in China
on the other hand. In particular, the calibration to China implies that the rapid
increase in the share of housing capital and the simultaneous decrease in the
consumption-output ratio observed in the Chinese data can be explained by a
combination of three factors: a high elasticity of substitution between the two
sectors, a high capital intensity of production of the housing sector, and a low
initial share of housing capital before the Chinese housing market reform.
The initial low share of housing capital before the reform has a large impact
on the Chinese economy. In a counterfactual experiment, when changing the
initial share of housing capital at the China level in 1987 to the US level of a
comparable development stage, the mean relative output of the housing sector
and the mean non-residential investment-output ratio increase by 11.3 percent
and 22.9 percent respectively. Meanwhile, the mean housing investment-output
ratio and the mean relative prices of housing services decrease by 16.1 percent
and 10 percent respectively. The comparative study suggests that the initial low
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share of housing capital in China has led to an over-investment in housing, an
under-investment in non-residential capital and a higher relative price of housing
services during its 30-year transition.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Derivation of equilibrium conditions
Given the state variables {kˆ, hˆ}, i.e. the capital stock in the two sectors.
{l, kˆ′, hˆ′} are chosen to maximize the following value function:
v
(
kˆ, hˆ
)
= max
l,kˆ′,hˆ′
{
u
(
cˆ, sˆ
)
+ βv
(
kˆ′, hˆ′
)}
s.t.:
cˆ = kˆαk(1− l)1−αk + (1− δ)(kˆ + hˆ)− A · (kˆ′ + hˆ′)
sˆ = hˆαhl1−αh
Substituting cˆ and sˆ into the value function, one obtains the dynamic pro-
gramming problem as follows:
v
(
kˆ, hˆ
)
= max
l,kˆ′,hˆ′
u
(
kˆαk(1−l)1−αk+(1−δ)(kˆ+hˆ)−A·(kˆ′+hˆ′), hˆαhl1−αh
)
+βv
(
kˆ′, hˆ′
)
FOC w.r.t [l]:
uc
us
=
(1− αh)hˆαhl−αh
(1− αk)kˆαk(1− l)−αk
(1.16)
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FOC w.r.t [kˆ′]:
A · uc = βvk
(
kˆ′, hˆ′
)
= βu′c ·
(
αk(kˆ
′)αk−1(1− l′)1−αk + 1− δ
)
(1.17)
FOC w.r.t [hˆ′]:
A · uc = βvh
(
kˆ′, hˆ′
)
= β
[
u′c · (1− δ) + u′s · αh(hˆ′)αh−1(l′)1−αh
]
(1.18)
Combining equation 1.17 and 1.18:
uc
us
=
αhhˆ
αh−1l1−αh
αkkˆαk−1(1− l)1−αk
(1.19)
Combining equation 1.16 and 1.19:
kˆ
hˆ
=
αk(1− αh)
αh(1− αk) ·
1− l
l
(1.20)
Equation 1.20 is identical to equation 1.7 from firm profit optimization. Further,
rearranging equation 1.19 gives:
kˆ
hˆ
=
αk
αh
· uc
us
· yˆ
sˆ
(1.21)
Equation 1.21 is identical to the non-arbitrage condition 1.8.
Further, equation 1.17 can be rewritten into Euler Equation as in 2.7:
uc
u′c
= β
[
αk · yˆ
′
kˆ′
+ 1− δ
]
(1.22)
Given a CES utility function, the marginal utility of c is given by:uc = η ·
[ηcˆ
−1
 + (1 − η)sˆ −1 ]
1−σ
−1 · cˆ−1 . Therefore, one obtains the same Euler equation
with 2.7.
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1.7.2 Proof
1. Proof for Proposition 1:
First, show that all economic variables grow at the same rate A. The aggregate
resource constraint 1.5 implies that y, c, a all have to grow at the same rate,
denoted by G along a balanced growth path. a = k + h implies that k and h
also grows at G. Further, production function in the nonresidential sector implies
G = GαkA1−αk . Also, production function in the housing sector implies that
growth rate in the housing sector is G = Aαh · A1−αh = A. Thus, along the
balanced growth path, variable y, c, s, a all grow at G = A.
Next, compute the steady-state share of capital in the housing sector κ∗ and
the steady-state capital per capita aˆ∗. Euler equation 2.7 implies that along the
BGP,
aˆ∗
z0 · (1− l∗) =
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
] 1
1−αk
(1− κ∗)−1 (1.23)
Dynamics of capital accumulation 1.11 implies that along the BGP,
(
cˆ
yˆ
)∗
= 1− (A+ δ − 1)
(
aˆ
yˆ
)∗
= 1− (A+ δ − 1)
[
aˆ∗
z0 · (1− l∗)
]1−αk
(1− κ∗)−αk
Combined with 1.23 implies that along the BGP,
(
cˆ
yˆ
)∗
= 1− (A+ δ − 1) · αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ) · (1− κ
∗)−1 (1.24)
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Production functions of both sectors 1.2 imply that along the BGP,
yˆ∗ = (1− κ∗)αk ·
[
aˆ∗
z0(1− l∗)
]αk
· [z0(1− l∗)]
sˆ∗ = (κ∗)αh ·
[
aˆ∗
z0(1− l∗)
]αh
·
(
1− l∗
l∗
)αh
· (z0l∗)
Substituting equation 1.10 and 1.23 into the expressions above implies:
yˆ∗ =
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
] αk
1−αk · [z0(1− l∗)]
sˆ∗ =
[
αh(1− αk)
αk(1− αh)
]αh
·
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
] αh
1−αk · (z0l∗)
Hence,(
yˆ
sˆ
)∗
=
[
αh(1− αk)
αk(1− αh)
]1−αh
·
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
]αk−αh
1−αk · 1− κ
∗
κ∗
(1.25)
Substituting equations 1.24 and 1.25 into equation 1.9, one obtains:
κ∗ =
1− n
1 +m
wherem =
[
αk
αh
· η
1−η
] [
αk(1−αh)
αh(1−αk)
](αh−1)(−1) [
αk
Aσ/β−(1−δ)
] (αk−αh)(−1)
1−αk , n = αk(A+δ−1)
Aσ/β−(1−δ) .
Substituting κ∗ into 1.23, one obtains:
aˆ∗ = z0 ·
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
] 1
1−αk · αh(1− αk)
αh(1− αk)(1− κ∗) + αk(1− αh)κ∗
For capital per effective labor in equation 1.23 to be nonnegative, it needs:
Aσ
β
> 1− δ (1.26)
Further, for κ∗ to take a plausible value within (0, 1), n needs to be within (0, 1),
which implies:
Aσ
β
> αkA+ (1− αk)(1− δ) & A > 1− δ (1.27)
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The two inequalities 1.26 and 1.27 implies the following parameter ranges:22
Aσ
β
> αkA+ (1− αk)(1− δ) & A > 1− δ (1.28)
Q.E.D.
2. Proof for Proposition 2:
dκ∗
d(1− η) = −
dκ∗
η
=
(1− n)m
(1 +m)2
· d logm
dη
Since n < 1 and d logm
dη
= 
(1−η)η ,
dκ∗
d(1−η) > 0.
d lnκ∗
dσ
= − n
1− n ·
d lnn
dσ
− m
1 +m
· d lnm
dσ
=
Aσ · lnA
Aσ − β(1− δ)
[
n
1− n +
m
1 +m
· (αk − αh)(− 1)
1− αk
]
Therefore, dκ
∗
dσ
> 0, if  > 1 − n
1−n · 1+mm · 1−αkαk−αh . Given the parameter ranges of
the model, n
1−n · 1+mm · 1−αkαk−αh > 1. Therefore, dκ
∗
dσ
> 0 for ∀ > 0.
d lnκ∗
d
= − m
1 +m
· ∂ lnm
∂
= − m
1 +m
· ln
αkαh · η1− η ·
[
αk(1− αh)
αh(1− αk)
](αh−1)
·
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
]αk−αh
1−αk

22Note that along BGP, the intuition for A
σ
β = 1 + r
∗, i.e. another interpretation of the
parameter range is r∗ ∈
(
αk(A+ δ − 1)− δ,∞
)
.
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Therefore, dκ
∗
d
> 0, if η ∈
(
0, 1
1+ω
)
, where ω =
(
αk
αh
)αh·(1−αh
1−αk
)αh−1·( αk
Aσ/β−(1−δ)
)αk−αh
1−αk .
Q.E.D.
3. Proof for Proposition 3:
daˆ∗
dz0
=
[
αk
Aσ/β − (1− δ)
] 1
1−αk · αh(1− αk)
αh(1− αk)(1− κ∗) + αk(1− αh)κ∗ > 0
daˆ∗
dA
=
d ln a∗
dA
· a∗ = − 1
1− αk ·
Aσ · lnA
Aσ − β(1− δ) < 0
daˆ∗
dκ∗
=
d ln a∗
dκ∗
· a∗ = − (αk − αh)a
∗
αh(1− αk)(1− κ∗) + αk(1− αh)κ∗
In the last expression, if αk > αh,
daˆ∗
dκ∗ < 0; if αk < αh,
daˆ∗
dκ∗ > 0 Q.E.D.
4. Proof for Proposition 4:
Equation 1.9 implies:
lnκ = − ln
(
1 +
αk
αh
· η
1− η ·
(
yˆ
sˆ
)1−1/
·
(
cˆ
yˆ
)−1/)
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It follows:
d lnκ
daˆ
= −1
κ
· αk
αh
· η
1− η ·
d
(
yˆ
sˆ
)1−1/ · ( cˆ
yˆ
)−1/
daˆ
∝ −
[(
yˆ
sˆ
)1−1/
· d (cˆ/yˆ)
−1/
daˆ
+
(
cˆ
yˆ
)−1/
· d (yˆ/sˆ)
1−1/
daˆ
]
= −
[
−1

(
cˆ
sˆ
)1−1/
·
(
cˆ
yˆ
)−1
· d ln(cˆ/yˆ)
daˆ
+
(
cˆ
sˆ
)−1/
· (− 1)(αk − αh)

· yˆ
sˆ
· 1
aˆ
]
=
1

· 1
aˆ
·
(
cˆ
sˆ
)1−1/
·
(
cˆ
yˆ
)−1 [
d ln(cˆ/yˆ)
d ln aˆ
− (− 1)(αk − αh)
]
∝ d ln(cˆ/yˆ)
d ln aˆ
− (− 1)(αk − αh)
This is because yˆ
sˆ
= (1−κ)
αk (1−l)1−αk
καh l1−αh · aˆαk−αh and therefore:
d lnκ
d ln aˆ
∝
{
d ln(cˆ/yˆ)
d ln aˆ
− (− 1)(αk − αh)
}
Hence, d lnκ
d ln aˆ
> 0 ⇐⇒ d ln(cˆ/yˆ)
d ln aˆ
> (− 1)(αk − αh).
The expression above shows that the correlation between the share of housing
capital and the consumption-output ratio is determined by the interplay of the
elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and the capital intensities of pro-
duction of the two sectors. To demonstrate the implications and the mechanism of
this proposition, I use the following numerical example for illustration. Suppose
that a model economy has already reached its balanced growth path.23 Suppose
that there is a permanent unexpected shock to the growth rate of the economy A,
23Three key parameters of the model , αk and αh are varied for illustration. The other
parameters of the model economy are set as: β = 0.96, η = 0.28, σ = 1, δ = 0.06, A = 1.04,
z0 = 10.
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such that the economy enters the transitional dynamics with capital deepening.
I consider two cases: (1) the production of the housing sector is labor intensive,
i.e. αk > αh; (2) the production of the housing sector is capital intensive, i.e.
αk < αk.
24 In each case, I compare two scenarios: (a) when the two sectors are
more substitutable ( > 1); (b) when the two sectors are more complementary
( < 1).25
Case 1: When the production of housing sector is labor intensive
(αk > αh)
Suppose that there is a permanent shock to the growth rate A such that the
economy enters transitional dynamics with capital deepening. Figure 1.9 shows
the comovement of the share of housing capital and consumption-output ratio for
both scenarios when  > 1 and  < 1.
Case 2: When the production of housing sector is capital intensive
(αk < αh)
Suppose that there is a permanent shock to the growth rate A such that the
economy enters transitional dynamics with capital deepening. Figure 1.10 shows
24In particular, for case 1, αk = 0.3 and αh = 0.1; for case 2, αk = 0.3 and αh = 0.5.
25For scenario (a),  = 1.81; for scenario (b),  = 0.76.
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the countermovement of the share of housing capital and consumption-output ra-
tio for both scenarios when  > 1 and  < 1.
Mechanism
Consider the case when the production of housing sector is labor intensive, and
the two sectors are more substitutable (αk > αh and  > 1). By Proposition 4, the
share of housing capital comoves with the consumption-output ratio. Figure 1.11
(a) present the arbitrage opportunities if Proposition 4 is violated, and Figure
1.11 (b) shows the case otherwise.
Q.E.D.
1.7.3 Robustness Check
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show alternative calibrations of the model economy, in
which I consider different values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the growth rate of the economy. The results in Table 1.9 are similar to those
of the benchmark calibration. The implication of capital and labor reallocation
are basically identical to the benchmark calibration. Also, the relative output
between the non-residential and the housing sector increases in the cases for all
three σ, implying the increase of the relative prices of housing services. Meanwhile,
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the general patterns implied by the different values of A in Table 1.10 are also
similar to the results of the benchmark calibration.
Table 1.9:
Data and Model Calibration, 1948-2005 (Robustness I)
Model Model Model
US Data σ = 0.5 σ = 2 σ = 3
 = 1.81, A = 1.0149  = 1.81, A = 1.0149  = 1.81, A = 1.0149
1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005
κ 0.4817 0.4949 0.4817 0.5008 0.4817 0.5009 0.4817 0.5008
l 0.7740 0.8063 0.7819 0.7947 0.7819 0.7947 0.7819 0.7947
c/y 0.6710 0.7041 0.4766 0.6159 0.5168 0.6159 0.5396 0.6157
s/y 0.1506 0.2226 0.1523 0.1653 0.1684 0.1653 0.1684 0.1653
Table 1.10:
Data and Model Calibration, 1948 - 2005 (Robustness II)
US Data
Model Model Model
A = 1.0049 A = 1.0200 A = 1.0400
 = 1.81, σ = 1  = 1.81, σ = 1  = 1.81, σ = 1
1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005 1948 2005
κ 0.4817 0.4949 0.4817 0.5023 0.4817 0.5002 0.4817 0.4986
l 0.7740 0.8063 0.7819 0.7956 0.7819 0.7942 0.7819 0.7932
c/y 0.6710 0.7041 0.5378 0.6335 0.5590 0.6080 0.5266 0.5826
s/y 0.1506 0.2226 0.1370 0.1451 0.1438 0.1496 0.1519 0.1555
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1.8 Data Constructions for China: 1987-2013
In [28], data for the developed economies are from their national capital ac-
counts, including consistent annual balance sheets26. In contrast, China does not
have such a national account for capital stock, giving rise to challenges in mea-
suring capital allocations in China. In this paper, I construct a dataset of capital
stock in China that is similar to the measure of capital stock for the five developed
economies as in [28]. In the following, I describe the approaches to construct this
dataset.
1.8.1 Agricultural Land Value in China
In order to measure the value of agricultural land in China, data for both
the land price and the land area are needed. The data for the land price index
in China is not available until 2000.27 To obtain a consistent time series data
for the land price in China, I take the 30 percent of the average sales price for
commercial residential housing in China as a proxy for the missing data between
1987 and 2000.28. It is not the most accurate measure, but is still reasonable
given a high correlation between the land price index and the average sales price
for commercial residential housing after 2000 in China.
26Following new international guidelines, the balance sheets report on the market value of
all the non-financial and financial assets and liabilities held by each sector of the economy
(households, government and corporations) and by the rest of the world
27Land price index data after 2000 can be found from Ministry of Land and Resource of China.
28This is because the availability of the average sales price for commercial residential housing
from [9]. In [12], the land value is approximately 30% of the housing sales value.
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Table 1.11: Data Sources for Areas of Agricultural Land in China
Year Mha Source
1987 137.3 Institute of Applied Remote Sensing CAS
1994 136.4 [10]
1995 131.1 State Land Administration Bureau
1996 133.3 State Land Administration Bureau
2008 96.0 China Statistical Yearbook (2014)
2012 65.0 Land and Resource Ministry of China
To obtain the time series data for the area of agricultural land between 1987
and 2012, I interpolate the time series from the data points obtained from var-
ious sources as shown in Table 1.1129. Figure 1.12 shows that the total area
of China’s agricultural land has been steadily decreasing. Table 1.12 shows the
dataset constructed for the agricultural land value to output ratio in China be-
tween 1987-2013, which shows that while the unit land price (yuan per sq.m) has
been increasing, the area of agricultural land keeps decreasing, and the agricul-
tural land value to output ratio is also decreasing.
29[31] made the effort in collecting data for the agricultural land use from various sources, and
I found two more recent data points from China Statistical Yearbook (2014) and the Land and
Resource Ministry of China
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1.8.2 Non-residential and Housing Capital in China
To measure the value of non-residential and housing capital in China, I take
the standard perpetual inventory approach. I initialize the housing capital in 1994
as the ratio of the housing investment in 199530 to the sum of the average growth
rate of the housing investment between 1995 and 2000 and the depreciation rate of
capital. Further, I estimate the housing investment for the missing years between
1987 and 1994 by 40 percent of the investment in construction and installment31,
and then back out the housing capital between 1987 and 1993 following the same
perpetual inventory approach. The values of nonresidential capital are estimated
using the same approach. In particular, the depreciation rate is assumed to be
8 % for housing, and 24% for machinery and equipment.32 To account for the
price effect on the housing capital in China, I construct the time series of housing
price indices, using the price indices of the investment in fixed assets between 1987
and 2003, and the real residential land price indices from [35] between 2004-2013.
Table 1.13 shows the capital allocation in China between 1987 and 2013.
30the first year when the investment data in housing are available
31In China Statistical Yearbook, data for the investment in construction and installment
started earlier from 1981. The available data show that the housing investment is about 40
percent of the investment in construction and installment.
32In [4], estimates of the useful lives of structures and buildings is 38 years, and of machinery
and equipment is 12 years
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1.9 A Statistical Comparison between the United
States and China
The aim is to find an appropriate development stage in the US economy for
comparison in the counterfactual experiment. CSY started to categorize the in-
vestment of total fixed assets into non-residential and housing from 1995 in Table
10.4, which allows a 19-year time series for analyzing the investment behavior in
China. In order to find an appropriate episode in the US economic history to com-
pare with, I resample the US data between 1930 and 2013, using a moving block
bootstrap approach proposed by [29]. In particular, I fix the length of the block
to be 19 years, and obtain 66 blocks of 19 years between 1930 and 2013 in the US
economy. Then, I calculate the joint correlations of the consumption-output ratio,
the non-residential capital-output ratio and the housing capital-output ratio for
the 66 blocks.
Figure 1.13 shows a comparison between the dynamics of the sectoral allocation
of capital in the US and China. Table 1.14 shows the joint correlation of the three
targeted variables between the US economy and China. The highlighted row
in Table 1.14 shows the highest joint correlation among the 66 sampled blocks.
Hence, I choose the episode of the US economy between 1956 and 1982 as a
reference for the study of China between 1987 and 2013.
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1.10 Numerical Solution Algorithm
The social planner’s problem in this paper is an extension of the standard
dynamic programming problem, with a two-dimensional state vector of nonresi-
dential and housing capital stock, (k, h). In particular, the detrended SP problem
of interest can be summarized by the following Bellman equation:
v(kˆ, hˆ) = max
kˆ′,hˆ′
[
(ηcˆ
−1
 + (1− η)sˆ −1 ) −1
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ + βv(kˆ
′, hˆ′)
subject to
cˆ = kˆαk(1− l)1−αk + (1− δ)(kˆ + hˆ)− A · (kˆ′ + hˆ′)
sˆ = hˆαhl1−αh
l =
{
1 +
αh(1− αk)
αk(1− αh)
(
kˆ
hˆ
)}−1
The solution algorithm follows:
1. Compute the steady-state value of κ∗ and aˆ∗ according to the assigned pa-
rameters.
2. Discretize the state space (kˆ, hˆ) on the gridded domain, where kˆ ∈ [kˆmin, kˆmax]
and hˆ ∈ [hˆmin, hˆmax]. [kˆmin, kˆmax] and [hˆmin, hˆmax] are chosen according to the
steady-state value of κ∗ and aˆ∗.
3. Taking hˆ′ as given, find the optimal kˆ′(kˆ, hˆ, hˆ′) by iterating on the following
value function until convergence:
vj+1(kˆ, hˆ) = max
kˆ′∈[kˆlb,kˆub]
u(cˆ(kˆ, hˆ, kˆ′, hˆ′)) + βvj(kˆ′, hˆ′)
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where the lower and upper bound for kˆ′ are kˆlb = max
{
(1−δ)kˆ
A
, kˆmin
}
and
kˆub = min
{
kˆαk (1−l)1−αk+(1−δ)kˆ−(Ahˆ′−(1−δ)hˆ)
A
, kˆmax
}
. Note that the upper bound
is chosen as in the extreme case when the consumption of the nondurable
goods and services is zero.
4. Taking the function kˆ′(kˆ, hˆ, hˆ′) as given, find the optimal hˆ′(kˆ, hˆ) by inter-
ating on the following value function until convergence:
vj+1(kˆ, hˆ) = max
hˆ′∈[hˆlb,hˆub]
u(cˆ(kˆ, hˆ, kˆ′(kˆ, hˆ, hˆ′), hˆ′)) + βvj(kˆ′(kˆ, hˆ, hˆ′), hˆ′)
where the lower and upper bound for hˆ′ are hˆlb = max
{
(1−δ)hˆ
A
, hˆmin
}
and
hˆub = min
{
kˆαk (1−l)1−αk+(1−δ)hˆ)
A
, hˆmax
}
. Note that the upper bound is chosen
as in the extreme case when both the consumption of the nondurable goods
and services and the nonresidential investment is zero, as if all the resources
were used for the housing investment.
With the policy functions kˆ′(kˆ, hˆ) and hˆ′(kˆ, hˆ), one can obtian a time-serise
simulation for the policy functions kˆ(t) and hˆ(t) by feeding in the intial values
(kˆ0, hˆ0).
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(f) China
Figure 1.1: Allocation of Domestic National Capital
Data Sources:
1. [28] for five developed economies.
2. Constructed for China. (See Appendix 1.8 for detailed construction approaches)
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(a) China: 1987-2013
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
GDP per Capita (USD) ×104
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
S
ha
re
 o
f H
ou
si
ng
 C
ap
ita
l
(b) US: 1720 -2011
Figure 1.2: GDP Per Capita vs. Share of Housing Capital
Data Sources:
1. GDP per capita: [5] for the United States; Penn World Table 8.1 for China. Both are in 2005
PPP-adjusted USD.
2. Share of housing capital: Computed using non-residential capital and housing (real) from
[28] for the United States; from Table 1.13 for China.
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(a) China: 1987-2011
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(b) US: 1950 -2011
Figure 1.3: GDP Per Capita vs. Share of Housing Capital
Data Sources:
1. GDP per capita: Penn World Table 8.1 for both the United States and China. Both are in
2005 PPP-adjusted USD.
2. Share of housing capital: Computed using non-residential capital and housing (real) from
Fixed Assets Table for the United States; from Table 1.13 for China.
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Figure 1.4: Share of Housing Capital vs. Consumption-Output Ratio
Data Sources: OECD Statistics
1. Average share of housing capital: Computed using non-residential capital and housing (real)
from the Balance Sheets for Non-financial Assets.
2. Average consumption-output ratio: Computed using consumption and output (real) from
the Final Consumption Expenditure of Households Table.
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Figure 1.5: Share of Housing Capital vs. Consumption-Output Ratio
Data Sources:
1. Share of housing capital: Computed using non-residential capital and housing (real) from
Fixed Assets Table for the United States; from Table 1.13 for China.
2. Consumption-output ratio: Computed using consumption and GDP (real) from NIPA for
the United States; from China Statistical Yearbook (2014) for China.
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Figure 1.6: Benchmark vs. Half initial κ0
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Figure 1.7: Negative Correlation between κ and c/y in China
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Figure 1.8: China Benchmark vs. US allocation
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Figure 1.9: Comovement of κ and c/y
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Figure 1.10: Countermovement of κ and c/y
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Figure 1.11: Return to the housing captial Rh
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Figure 1.12: Areas of Agricultural Land in China: 1987- 2012
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Table 1.12: Agricultural Land Value to Output Ratio
Year Mha Land price Land value to output Ratio
(1010 sq.m) (yuan/sq.m) (%)
1987 137.3∗ 122.5 139.52
1988 137.2 150.9 137.65
1989 137.1 172.1 138.72
1990 137.0 210.9 154.28
1991 136.8 226.9 142.25
1992 136.7 298.9 151.74
1993 136.6 362.5 140.45
1994 136.4∗ 358.2 101.56
1995 131.1∗ 452.7 99.22
1996 133.3∗ 481.4 91.48
1997 130.0 536.9 89.40
1998 126.7 556.1 84.88
1999 123.6 557.1 77.81
2000 120.5 584.5 71.87
2001 117.5 605.0 65.78
2002 114.6 627.5 60.36
2003 111.7 659.2 54.55
2004 108.9 764.6 52.23
2005 106.2 881.1 50.96
2006 103.6 935.8 44.88
2007 101.0 1093.6 41.45
2008 96.0∗ 1072.7 32.58
2009 88.8 1337.8 34.91
2010 82.1 1417.5 29.12
2011 76.0 1498.0 24.29
2012 65.0∗ 1629.0 20.43
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Table 1.13: Allocation of National Capital
Year Capital-output ratio
Non-residential Housing Agricultural Land Aggregate
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1987 117.55 51.22 139.52 308.29
1988 105.95 46.01 137.65 289.60
1989 100.92 44.48 138.72 284.12
1990 97.84 43.60 154.28 295.72
1991 92.23 41.08 142.25 275.56
1992 87.64 38.29 151.74 277.66
1993 86.30 36.22 140.45 262.96
1994 145.84 60.83 101.56 308.24
1995 127.25 52.94 99.22 279.40
1996 118.63 48.94 91.48 259.05
1997 116.96 47.34 89.40 253.70
1998 121.08 48.65 84.88 254.61
1999 123.46 49.97 77.81 251.24
2000 121.67 49.26 71.87 242.80
2001 121.78 48.81 65.78 236.37
2002 123.94 48.65 60.36 232.95
2003 127.48 47.49 54.55 229.52
2004 128.80 45.42 52.23 226.45
2005 136.58 53.63 50.96 241.18
2006 142.34 61.49 44.88 248.72
2007 141.75 84.27 41.45 267.46
2008 148.51 76.41 32.58 257.50
2009 174.94 112.73 34.91 322.58
2010 181.23 148.96 29.12 359.31
2011 188.90 165.19 24.29 378.37
2012 209.10 173.02 20.43 402.56
2013 257.01 217.41 18.08 492.50
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Figure 1.13: Sectoral Allocation of Captial: US v.s. China
Table 1.14: Joint Correlation of c/y, k/y and h/y
c/y h/y k/y
1963-81 0.9422 0.5407 0.7401
1964-82 0.9421 0.6663 0.9003
1965-83 0.8958 0.5695 0.9479
1966-84 0.8371 0.4348 0.9376
1967-85 0.7376 0.2732 0.9099
1968-86 0.6073 0.0702 0.8879
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Chapter 2
Human Capital Spillover and
Housing Price
2.1 Introduction
Human capital concentration and housing price growth usually go hand in
hand. Compared with other regions in the United States, the agglomeration in
San Francisco, California attracts workers with high level of human capital, giving
rise to both higher local wages and higher local housing prices. Similar empirical
patterns are also observed in China. Since the Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
policy, SEZ regions have drawn a large number of migrants from the non-SEZ
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regions in China.1 At the same time, housing price of the SEZ regions stay higher
than that of the non-SEZ regions.
Some aspects of the migration process are puzzling. During this process, many
of the new migrants seem to worse off than they were where they come from. They
are faced with higher housing prices, live in more congested space, and have no
regular jobs. What drives them to keep coming? [30] shows that 60 percent of
human capital concentration is due to enhanced wage, with the rest caused by
growth in living quality, all of which in turn drive up housing price. As shown in
Table 2.1, compared with the non-SEZ cities and the national average, Beijing and
Shanghai, as representatives of the SEZ cities, experience a significantly higher
growth in population, housing price indices, and level of GDP per capita.
Literature has studies the external effect of human capital that leads to human
capital concentration.2 A natural question that arises is that what is the external
effect of human capital on the housing price. In this paper, I propose a two-region
model to address this question. In the model, high wage in the SEZ region reflect
high level of human capital, and these jobs are not available to low human capital
migrants from the non-SEZ economy. The migrants come to the SEZ economy for
two reasons: on the one hand, the SEZ economy is a better place to accumulate
human capital and earn a higher wage in the future; on the other hand, the SEZ
1Special Economic Zone policy is one of the series of economic reform undertaken in China
since 1979. The Chinese government selected a few regions along the coastal areas, where
special treatment policies are provided, including special tax incentives for investments, and
independence on trade activities.
2See [14] and [26].
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Table 2.1
Growth in Growth in Average GDP Per Capita
Share of Population (%) Housing Price Index (%) in 2005 USD
2006-2013 2006-2013 2006-2013
National 4.3 169.3 5238
Representative SEZ Cities
Beijing 27.1 353.4 11652
Shanghai 18.8 286.0 11262
Representative Non-SEZ Cities
Wuhan 3.6 60.1 5327
Xi’an 6.2 73.0 4352
Data Sources:
1 Share of population: China Statistical Yearbook 2014
2 Housing price index: [35]
3 GDP per capita: China Statistical Yearbook 2014
4 SEZ: Special Economic Zone, regions that have received subsidiary policy of Chinese government
5 Non-SEZ: regions that have not received subsidiary policy of Chinese government
economy has a better amenities for living. The theory shows that during the
migration process, the spillover effect of human capital has a significant positive
impact on the increase of housing prices.
The model is based on the two-region economy of [26]. The non-SEZ economy
has a Cobb-Douglas production technology with a single labor input, where as the
SEZ economy has a human-capital based production technology. In particular,
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each migrant to the SEZ economy allocate a fixed time endowment between la-
boring for wage that is indicated by one’s current level of human capital and accu-
mulating human capital so as to increase future wage. I start with considering the
equilibrium allocations in the non-SEZ economy and in the SEZ, human-capital
based economy, both in isolation first. In the baseline model with migration, the
share of population that choose to migrate to the SEZ economy is determined by
the utility equalization between living in either economy. In the baseline model,
the migration occurs all at once at the first period. Further, I extend the baseline
model by incorporating the spillover effect of human capital: time invested in hu-
man capital accumulation has a higher return in high human capital environment.
In this case, the migration to the SEZ economy becomes increasingly attractive as
the gap between the human capital leaders and followers increase. By comparing
the extended model with the baseline, the effect of human capital spillover can be
captured.
2.2 The Model
Consider a two-sector (non-SEZ and SEZ) economy, with a fixed total popula-
tion of identical households, viewed as infinitely-lived dynasties. Every household
has preferences
∞∑
t=0
u(ct,mt, at)
(1 + ρ)t
(2.1)
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over paths ct of nondurable consumption goods, mt of housing services, and at of
amenities within living environment, which is positively correlated with GDP per
capita. ρ is a measure of time preference.
Assume that the functional form of the households’ preference is
u(c,m, a) = µc log(c) + µm log(m) + µa log(a)
where µc, µm and µa denote the household’s preference weights of consumption in
nondurable good, housing services, and living amenity, respectively. Each house-
hold is endowed with one unit of time, supplied inelastically to income-directed
activities: working for wages and accumulating human capital. Each household
is endowed with one unit of production land, which yields a rental return.3 In
both economies, total population and housing services are normalized to unity,
and housing services are assumed to be supplied inelastically. The main focus of
the model will be on the labor reallocation from non-SEZ to SEZ, but I begin by
setting notation and describing resource allocation for two polar economies.
2.2.1 Non-SEZ Polar Economy
In the non-SEZ polar economy, each household is endowed with one unit of
production land, which is combined with labor to produce nondurable goods using
a Cobb-Douglas technology:
F (xt) = Ax
α
t
3For simplicity of analysis, I assume that the only physical capital in the model is land.
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where x denote the employment, A denotes the constant labor productivity, and
α denotes the labor intensity of production.
Human capital is assumed to have no effect on the labor productivity in the
non-SEZ polar case, so no time is spent to human capital accumulation in the
non-SEZ economy. In an economy where the entire workforce is employed in
production, the competitive wage is wt = F
′(1), and the equilibrium nondurable
good consumption is ct = F (1) = A. Capital return on production land is F (1)−
F ′(1), and interest rate is constant at rt = ρ. Meanwhile, the equilibrium housing
service consumption mt = 1 due to the inelastic supply and the market-clearing
of housing services. Normalize the price of nondurable consumption goods to one.
The competitive equilibrium relative price of housing services is
pt =
um(ct,mt, at)
uc(ct,mt, at)
=
Aµm
µc
(2.2)
which indicates that the equilibrium relative price of housing services in the non-
SEZ polar economy stays constant, and is determined by the labor productivity
of production of the economy. Note that the preference weight of living amenities
does not affect the relative price of housing services in the non-SEZ polar economy.
2.2.2 SEZ Polar Economy
In the SEZ polar economy, the production technology for nondurable goods is
linear in the labor inputs.
G(νt, ht) = νtht (2.3)
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which means that a worker with human capital ht who spends νt units of time
labor will produce νtht units of nondurable consumption goods.
Human capital accumulation follows:
ht+1 − ht = δht(1− νt) (2.4)
where 1− ν(t) represents the time spent for the knowledge-improving activities,4
and δ denotes the rate of return for the time spent to accumulate human capital.
Denote the rental price of production land and wage rate by R and w, and the
interest rate by r. Let p denote the relative price of housing services. The budget
constraint for the households in the SEZ polar economy for each period t is
ct + ptmt ≤ wtνt +Rt (2.5)
which means that the expenditure on consumption of nondurable goods and hous-
ing services is no more than the sum of labor and non-labor earnings.
Without loss of generality, assume that the living amenity at is linear in the
total production of the economy, i.e., at = γG(νt, ht), γ > 0. Assume that the
measure of households are continuous such that each household is infinitesimal,
which means that each single household cannot decide the level of living amenities.
Taking the path of living amenities (at)t≥0 and the paths of prices (rt, Rt, wt, pt)t≥0
as given, each household makes consumption decision (ct,mt)t≥0, the time allo-
cation between labor and accumulating human capital (νt)t≥0, and the stock of
4[26] gives examples of knowledge-improving activities, including useful experience on and
off the job, as well as schooling.
71
human capital (ht)t≥0 to maximize the lifetime utility of (2.1), subject to dynamics
of human capital accumulation (2.4) and the budget constraint (2.5).
The equilibrium interest rate must equal to the rate of return of human cap-
ital accumulation whenever households engage in both labor and human capital
accumulation.
rt = δ (2.6)
This is from the linearity in time for both production technology (2.3) and human
capital accumulation (2.4).
Euler equation implies
ct+1
ct
=
1 + rt
1 + ρ
=
1 + δ
1 + ρ
(2.7)
which implies that the consumption of nondurable goods grows at a constant rate.
The equilibrium relative price of housing services is determined by the marginal
rate of substitution between the nondurable goods and housing services, pt =
µm
µc
· ct
mt
. In equilibrium, due to market clearing, m = 1 for all t, we have:
pt+1
pt
=
ct+1
ct
=
1 + δ
1 + ρ
(2.8)
which means that the relative price of housing services in the SEZ polar economy
is growing at the same constant rate as consumption over time.
A balanced growth path of the SEZ economy is defined as an equilibrium,
along which the time allocation between labor and human capital accumulation
stays constant, and all the variables of the economy {wt, ht, pt, ct, at} grow at the
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same rate.
Proposition 1: Assume that ρ ≤ δ. There exists a unique balanced growth path,
along which the steady-state time allocation between labor and human capital
accumulation is:
ν∗ =
ρ+ δρ
δ + δρ
(2.9)
Further, the variables of the economy {wt, ht, pt, ct, at} grow at rate of δ−ρ1+ρ .
The result from Proposition 1 aligns with AK model of endogenous growth,
where all economic variables grow at the same rate, and the growth rate depends
on the accumulation of human capital.
2.2.3 A Baseline Model of Migration
With two polar economies specified, I turn to study the economy with migra-
tion. The household’s optimization problem remain the same, except that each
household is free to move, and is able to choose to work in either economy. As-
sume that all households start from the non-SEZ economy, and are endowed with
a common human capital level h0. With identical households, the migration oc-
curs only once at period 0, leaving a constant fraction of households permanently
staying in the non-SEZ economy.
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Denote x0 as the share of population migrating to the SEZ economy, and 1−x0
stands for the share of population staying in the non-SEZ economy. For the non-
SEZ economy, market clearing conditions in both nondurable good consumption
and housing service consumption, (1 − x0)cnt = F (1 − x0) = A(1 − x0)α and
(1−x0)mnt = 1, imply that the equilibrium consumption of nondurable goods and
housing services in the non-SEZ economy are functions of x0:
cnt (x0) = A(1− x0)α−1 (2.10)
mnt (x0) =
1
1− x0 (2.11)
The equilibrium living amenity can also be written as a function of x0:
ant (x0) = Aγ(1− x0)α (2.12)
Equation (2.2) implies that the equilibrium relative price of housing services in
the non-SEZ economy is:
pnt (x0) =
µm
µc
A(1− x0)α (2.13)
Meanwhile, with migration, the emerging SEZ economy is populated with
x0 measure of households. Market clearing conditions in nondurable good and
housing service consumption imply:
cst · x0 = G(ust , hst) (2.14)
mst(x0) =
1
x0
(2.15)
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Equations (2.6), (2.9), (2.7) and (2.19) imply:
rst = δ (2.16)
νt = ν
∗ =
ρ(1 + δ)
δ(1 + ρ)
(2.17)
cst = c
s
0
(
1 + δ
1 + ρ
)t
(2.18)
pst(x0) = x0c
s
0 ·
µm
µc
(
1 + δ
1 + ρ
)t
(2.19)
where cs0 = ν
∗h0 =
ρ(1+δ)
δ(1+ρ)
h0 represents the initial nondurable good consumption.
Further, the living amenity each period can be written as:
ast(x0) = γG(u
s
t , h
s
t) (2.20)
Denote the maximized lifetime utility for the households who stay in the non-
SEZ economy by the value function V n(x0) =
∑∞
t=0
u(cnt (x0),m
n
t (x0),a
n
t (x0))
(1+ρ)t
. Denote
the maximized lifetime utility for the households who migrate to the SEZ economy
by the value function V s(x0) =
∑∞
t=0
u(cst (x0),m
s
t (x0),a
s
t (x0))
(1+ρ)t
.
Lemma 1: In the baseline model of migration, there exists a unique equilibrium
in which both V n and V s are functions of x0. In particular,
V n(x0) =
1 + ρ
ρ
{
f(Θ)−
[
µc + µm − α(µc + µa)
]
log(1− x0)
}
(2.21)
where Θ is a set of parameters, and f(·) = (µc + µa) logA+ µa log γ, and
V s(x0) =
1 + ρ
ρ
{
g(Θ) + (µa − µm) log x0
}
(2.22)
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where g(·) = (µc + µa)
[
log
(
ρ
δ
)
+ ρ+1
ρ
log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
+ log(h0)
]
+ µa log γ. The unique
equilibrium share of population staying in the non-SEZ economy x∗0 is determined
by
V n(x∗0) = V
s(x∗0).
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Figure 2.1: x∗0 in the Baseline Model of Migration
Figure 2.1 shows that with more households migrating to the SEZ economy,
i.e., as x0 increases, the households who stay in the non-SEZ economy gain more
consumption per capita of both nondurable goods and housing services, which
is represented by the first expression of the slope of the value function, ∂V
n
∂x0
.
And, with more labor engaging in production, the total production and thus the
living amenity level decrease. This causes utility loss, which is represented by
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the second expression of the slope of the value function, ∂V
n
∂x0
.5 Hence, the value
function of households staying in the non-SEZ economy is increasing in the share
of population migrating, if the gain from more consumption of nondurable good
and housing service consumption is higher than the loss from deteriorating living
amenities, i.e., µc + µm > α(µc + µa), and vice versa.
Meanwhile, with more households populated in the SEZ economy, more labor
inputs in production lead to a higher level of total production. Hence, the migrat-
ing households gain from the improving living amenities, which is represented by
the first expression of the slope of the value function, ∂V
s
∂x0
. At the same time, more
population cause congestion, i.e. less consumption per capita of housing services
given the fixed supply of housing services. This causes utility loss, which is rep-
resented by the second expression of the slope of the value function, ∂V
s
∂x0
. Hence,
the value function of households migrating to the SEZ economy is increasing in
the share of population migrating if the preference weight of living amenities is
higher than that of housing service consumption, i.e., µa > µm, and vice versa.
Denote the share of production in the SEZ economy as ωt, and the ratio of
relative price of housing services between the two economies as λt.
5This is because of the positive correlation between living amenities and GDP per capita by
assumption.
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Proposition 2: In the equilibrium of migration in the baseline economy, the
share of production in the SEZ economy, ωt, is:
ωt =
x∗0h0ν
∗
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)t
x∗0ν∗h0
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)t
+ A(1− x∗0)α
(2.23)
and the ratio of relative price of housing services between the two economies, λt,
is:
λt =
ρ
δ
· x
∗
0h0
A(1− x∗0)α
(
1 + δ
1 + ρ
)t+1
(2.24)
Figure 2.2 shows the dynamics of the share of production in the SEZ economy
and the ratio of relative price of housing services between the two economies over
time. Over the 50-period transition, both the share of production in the SEZ
economy and the ratio of relative price of housing services increases.
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Figure 2.2: Share of Production and Ratio of Relative Price of Housing Services
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The baseline model captures the increase in the share of production and the
increase in the relative of housing prices in the SEZ economy. However, the
migration only occurs once and for all, leaving a constant fraction of population
permanently staying in the non-SEZ economy.
2.2.4 Migration with Human Capital Spillover Effect
In order to incorporate the multi-period migration process into the model,
I extend the baseline model such that an externality affects the human capital
accumulation.6 In this case, the model suggests a multi-period migration and a
population in which different cohorts of migrants have different levels of human
capital in the SEZ economy.
Let hs,t denote the human capital at period t of a household who migrate to
the SEZ economy at period s ≤ t. Note that households in the migration cohort
s behave identically. Assume that the entry-level of human capital is ht,t = h0.
Further letHt denote the highest level of human capital that any worker in the SEZ
economy has attained at date t, and assume that the human capital accumulation
technology is given by:
hs,t+1 = hs,t + δ
(
Ht
hs,t
)θ
hs,t(1− νs,t) (2.25)
6[19] suggested that production can be affected by an externality, in the sense that more
productive people nearby can make any individual more productive. [14] and [26] propose
a formulation in which an externality affects the technology for accumulating human capital
rather than the technology for goods production. In this paper, I adopt the latter formulation.
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where θ > 0 is a parameter that captures the spillover effect of the human capital
of the leaders on those of the followers.7 Compared with the human capital
accumulation technology of the baseline model implied by (2.4), (2.25) magnifies
the return of δ by an increasing function of the gap between the followers’ human
capital hs,t and the leaders’ human capital Ht. Hence, migration to the SEZ
economy will become increasingly attractive over time, as those who have migrated
earlier accumulate higher level of human capital.
As before, the equilibrium interest rate is also equal to δ. In this case, the
human capital leaders will be the only labor engaging in production in equilibrium,
and all the new migrants will specialize in accumulating human capital until they
catch up and become leaders themselves. This is because of the linearity in labor
for both production technology and human capital accumulation technology.8The
external effects create two classes of cohorts of migrants in the SEZ economy:
labor and full-time learners.
Let zt be the number of leaders at time t, i.e., the number of migrants who
have attained the skill level Ht of the leaders and are now producing goods as well
as accumulating human capital in the SEZ economy. Their human capital evolves
according to:
Ht+1 = Ht + δ(1− νt)Ht (2.26)
7One way to understand the spillover effect is that leaders can lead followers to catch up
faster.
8This point is also proved in [26] and [14].
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The human capital for someone who migrate at period s evolves for t ≥ s according
to:
hs,t+1 = hs,t + δ
(
Ht
hs,t
)θ
hs,t (2.27)
which is the case of (2.25) but with νs,t = 0.
For every migration cohort s, there will be a catch-up date Ts, at which hs,t =
Ht first holds. Figure 2.3 shows the levels of human capital for different cohorts
of migrants. For the first cohort of migrants, s = 1, the catch-up date is T1 = 4.
That being said, the first cohort of migrants specialize in accumulating human
capital until period t = 4. For the second cohort of migrants, s = 2, the catch-up
date is Ts = 6, i.e., the second cohort migrants specialize in accumulating human
capital until period t = 6. Denote xt as the share of population who migrates to
the SEZ economy at period t. We have the number of leaders, who are also labors
engaging in production, satisfy the following equation:
zTs = xs (2.28)
In Figure 2.3, we have z4 = x1, i.e., the number of leaders at the catch-up date
for the first cohort of migrants, T1 = 4, is equal to the share of population who
have migrated to the SEZ economy in period 1, which consist of the leaders and
the first cohort of migrants. Further, z6 = x2, i.e., the number of leaders at the
catch-up date for the second cohort of migrants, T2 = 6, is equal to the share of
population who have migrated to the SEZ economy in period 2, which consist of
the leaders, the first and the second cohorts of migrants.
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Figure 2.3: Levels of Human Capital for Different Cohorts of Migrants
Households choose to migrate whenever the expected utility from migrating
is greater or equal to that from staying. An equilibrium with a multi-period migra-
tion is defined as a collection of allocations in the non-SEZ economy {cn,t,mn,t, an,t},
and a collection of allocations in the SEZ economy, {cs,t,ms,t, νs,t, at, Ht, zt, Ts},9
the relative price of housing services in both non-SEZ and SEZ economies {pnt , pst},
and the share of population migrating to the non-SEZ economy {xt}, that satisfy:
1. Given the relative prices of housing services and the share of population
migrating to the SEZ economy, households maximize utilities in either econ-
omy, such that the allocations in both economies are implied by the equa-
tions (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), and (2.28)
9In particular, cs,t,ms,t, us,t denote the consumption of nondurable goods and housing ser-
vices, and the time spent in labor for migration cohort s at time t.
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(1a) cn,t = A(1 − xt)α−1 and cs,t = cn,t, for t ≤ Ts, and cs,t = cs,Ts ·(
1+δ
1+ρ
)t−Ts
, for t ≥ Ts, where cs,Ts = ν∗h0.
(1b) mn,t =
1
1−xt and ms,t =
µm
µc
· cs,t
pst
.
(1c) νs,t = 0 for t ≤ Ts and νs,t = ν∗ for t > Ts.
(1d) zTs = xs for ∀s ≥ 0.
(1e) an,t = γA(1− xt)α and at = γ · zt · (ν∗Ht).
2. Both markets clear in the SEZ economy, i.e., for ∀t ≥ 0,
(2a) x0m0,t +
t∑
s=1
(xs − xs−1)ms,t = 1.
(2b) x0c0,t +
t∑
s=1
(xs − xs−1)cs,t = zt · (ν∗Ht).
I focus on the equilibrium in which households correctly anticipate the share of
population who migrate to the SEZ economy at each period without uncertainty.
An alternative interpretation is that a social planner with perfect information is
solving for an optimal labor allocation problem. Suppose that there are N cohorts
of migration.10 Note that I assign the consumption of nondurable goods for the
followers before they turn to leaders equal to the consumption in the non-SEZ
economy, as shown in (1a).
10Note that N is also determined in equilibrium.
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The flow utility if staying in the non-SEZ economy at period t is a function of
xt:
unt (xt) = µc log(cn,t) + µm log(mn,t) + µa log(an,t)
= f(Θ)− [µc + µm − α(µc + µa)] log(1− xt)
where f(Θ) = (µc + µa) logA + µa log γ is defined as in (2.21). Market clearing
conditions (2a) and (2b) imply the relative price of housing services in the SEZ
economy is:
pst =
µm
µc
· zt · (ν∗Ht) (2.29)
Hence, the consumption of housing services for households who choose to migrate
at cohort s at period t is:
ms,t =

A(1−xt)α−1
ztν∗Ht , if t < Ts
zt ·
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)−Ts
, if t > Ts
And, the flow utility of a household who migrate to the SEZ economy at cohort s
at period t is a function of both xt and zt:
ust(xt, zt) =

(µc + µm)
[
logA+ (α− 1) log(1− xt)
]
+ µa log γ + (µa − µm)
[
log zt + ...
log
(
ρ
δ
)
+ log h0 + (t+ 1) log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
) ]
, if t < Ts
(µc + µm)
[
log
(
ρ
δ
)
+ log h0 + (t+ 1) log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
) ]
+ µa log γ + (µm + µa) log zt − ...
(µc + µm)Ts log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
, if t > Ts
For the last cohort of migrants, i.e., the N th cohort, the share of population
in the non-SEZ economy who are willing to migrate to the SEZ economy is deter-
mined by the indifference between living in either economy, i.e., xN is determined
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by
V n(xN) = V
N(xN , zN)
where V n(·) = ∑∞t=N unt (xt)(1+ρ)t and V N(·) = ∑∞t=N uNt (xt,zt)(1+ρ)t , with unt and ust defined
above.
For the second last cohort of migrants, i.e., the N − 1th cohort, by the same
reasoning, the share of population in the non-SEZ economy who are willing to
migrate to the SEZ economy is determined by the indifference between living in
either economy, i.e., xN−1 is determined by
V n(xN−1) = V N−1(xN−1, zN−1)
where V n(·) = ∑∞t=N−1 unt (xt)(1+ρ)t and V N(·) = ∑∞t=N−1 uN−1t (xt,zt)(1+ρ)t , with unt and ust
defined above. By induction, I construct an equation system with N+1 equations
as follows: 
V n(xN) = V
s(xN , zN)
V n(xN−1) = V N−1(xN−1, zN−1)
· · ·
V n(x1) = V
1(x1, z1)
V n(x0) = V
0(x0, z0)
(2.30)
Lemma 2: In the baseline model of migration, there exists an equilibrium in
which {x∗0, ..., x∗N , z∗0 , ..., z∗N} solves the following equation system (2.30), (2.26),
(2.27) and (2.28).
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Once solved the equilibrium, I compute the share of production in the SEZ
economy, ωt, and the ratio of relative price of housing services between the two
economies, λt.
Proposition 3: In the equilibrium of migration with human capital spillover
effect, the share of production in the SEZ economy, ωt, is:
ωt =
zt · ν∗h0
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)t
zt · ν∗h0
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)t
+ A(1− xt)α
(2.31)
and the relative price ratio of housing services between the two economies, λt, is:
λt =
ρ
δ
· zth0
A(1− xt)α
(
1 + δ
1 + ρ
)t+1
(2.32)
Comparing (2.36) and (2.32), the effect of human capital spillover on the hous-
ing price can be computed as:
λratiot =
(1− x∗0)α
x∗0
· zt
1− xt (2.33)
Equation (2.33) shows that as there are more leaders in the SEZ economy, i.e.,
larger zt, there will be more households who migrate to the SEZ economy, i.e.,
smaller xt, both of which contribute to higher housing prices, compared to the
baseline economy.
2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a two-region model to address this question. In the
model, high wage in the SEZ region reflect high level of human capital, and these
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jobs are not available to low human capital migrants from the non-SEZ economy.
The migrants come to the SEZ economy for two reasons: on the one hand, the
SEZ economy is a better place to accumulate human capital and earn a higher
wage in the future; on the other hand, the SEZ economy has a better amenities
for living. The theory shows that during the migration process, the spillover effect
of human capital has a significant positive effect on the increase of housing prices.
In the model, the non-SEZ economy has a Cobb-Douglas production technol-
ogy with a single labor input, where as the SEZ economy has a human-capital
based production technology. In particular, each migrant to the SEZ economy
allocate a fixed time endowment between laboring for wage that is indicated by
one’s current level of human capital and accumulating human capital so as to
increase future wage. I start with considering the equilibrium allocations in the
non-SEZ economy and in the SEZ, human-capital based economy, both in iso-
lation first. In the baseline model with migration, the share of population that
choose to migrate to the SEZ economy is determined by the utility equalization
between living in either economy. In the baseline model, the migration occurs all
at once at the first period. Further, I extend the baseline model by incorporating
the spillover effect of human capital: time invested in human capital accumulation
has a higher return in high human capital environment. In this case, the migra-
tion to the SEZ economy becomes increasingly attractive as the gap between the
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human capital leaders and followers increase. By comparing the extended model
with the baseline, the effect of human capital spillover can be captured.
2.4 Appendix
Proof for Proposition 1 Suppose that there exists a defined balanced growth path.
Equation (2.5) implies
ht+1
ht
=
ct+1
ct
= 1 + δ(1− ut) (2.34)
Combined with (2.7), we have a unique constant equilibrium time allocation be-
tween labor and human capital accumulation, denoted by ν.
ν =
ρ+ δρ
δ + δρ
Since ν ∈ [0, 1], it requires that ρ ≤ δ. Further, (2.5) implies that:
wt+1
wt
=
ht+1
ht
=
pt+1
pt
=
ct+1
ct
=
at+1
at
= 1 + δ(1− ν) = 1 + δ
1 + ρ
Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma: Equations (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) imply that the value
function of households staying in the non-SEZ economy is the maximized lifetime
utility, a function of x0, as follows:
V n(x0) =
∞∑
t=0
µc log (c
n
t (x0)) + µm log (m
n
t (x0)) + µa log(a
n
t (x0))
(1 + ρ)t
=
1 + ρ
ρ
{
(µc + µa) logA+ µa log γ −
[
µc + µm − α(µc + µa)
]
log x0
}
88
Equations (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.18), (2.19) and (2.20) imply that the value
function of households migrating to the SEZ economy is the maximized lifetime
utility, a function of x0, as follows:
V s(x0) =
∞∑
t=0
µc log (c
s
t) + µm log (m
s
t(x0)) + µa log(a
s
t(x0))
(1 + ρ)t
=
{
(µc + µa)
[
log
(
ρ
δ
)
+ log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
+ log(h0)
]
+ µa log γ + (µa − µm) log(1− x0)
}
...
∞∑
t=0
1
(1+ρ)t
+ (µc + µa) log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
) ∞∑
t=1
t
(1+ρ)t
= 1+ρ
ρ
{
(µc + µa)
[
log
(
ρ
δ
)
+ log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
+ log(h0)
]
+ µa log γ + (µa − µm) log(1− x0)
}
+ 1+ρ
ρ2
(µc + µa) log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
= 1+ρ
ρ
{
g(Θ) + (µa − µm) log(1− x0)
}
where g(Θ) = (µc + µa)
[
log
(
ρ
δ
)
+ 1+ρ
ρ
log
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
+ log(h0)
]
+ µa log γ. Both value
functions of V n(x0) and V
s(x0) are common knowledge. x
∗
0 is determined when
V n(x∗0) = V
s(x∗0). Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 2: Once solving for the equilibrium share of population be-
tween the non-SEZ and SEZ economies, we obtain the solution for all the variables
of the economy. In particular, the share of production in the SEZ economy, ωt,
can be computed as:
ωt =
x0G(u
s
t , h
s
t)
x0G(ust , h
s
t) + F (x
∗
0)
=
x0νtht
x0νtht + A(1− x∗0)α
(2.35)
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where νt = ν
∗, and ht = h0
(
1+δ
1+ρ
)
. The ratio of relative price of housing services
between the two economies, λt, can be computed as:
λt =
pst(x
∗
0)
pnt (x
∗
0)
=
cs0 · x∗0
A(1− x∗0)α
(
1 + δ
1 + ρ
)t
(2.36)
where cs0 = ν
∗h0 =
ρ(1+δ)
δ(1+ρ)
h0. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Arrow-Debreu Abstract
Economy for General Equilibrium
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
In their classic 1954 paper, Arrow and Debreu introduce a market partici-
pant to Walrasian general equilibrium model, who plays the price-setting role and
maximizes the value of the market excess demand.1 They assume that the market
participant and other economic agents move simultaneously and independently.
The simultaneity of the moves implies that the market participant does not max-
imize the value of the instantaneous market excess demand, but it takes market
1See [2].
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excess demand as given when revising the prices. The simultaneity also makes the
resulting economy with the market participant, known as an abstract economy,
not well behaved in that the feasibility of an economic agent’s choice depends on
the market participant’s choice which the agent cannot directly observe.
The process underlying the determination of equilibrium price by the Wal-
rasian auctioneer in a competitive market works as follows. The Walrasian auc-
tioneer sets a price first and then the economic agents observe the price and decide
what quantities they want to supply or demand at that price. To capture this
dynamic nature, we consider a dynamic variation of the Arrow-Debreu abstract
economy with two stages. The market auctioneer selects a price vector in Stage 1
and subsequently each consumer observes the auctioneer’s selection and simulta-
neously and independently chooses an affordable bundle in Stage 2. The dynamic
variation makes it natural for the consumers’ feasible choices to depend on the
market auctioneer’s choice. Thus, instead of inducing a pseudo game as with the
simultaneous move Arrow-Debreu abstract economy, the extensive form game of
our dynamic variation is well defined. As such, various game-theoretic solution
concepts with or without symmetric information can be applied. We show that
the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of Wal-
rasian equilibrium allocations when information is symmetric. The set of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of rational expectations
equilibrium with asymmetric information.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the dynamic
abstract economy with symmetric information. Section 3 presents the dynamic
abstract economy with asymmetric information. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Dynamic Abstract Economy with Complete
Information
Let E = (Xi, ωi, ui)ni=1 be an n-person exchange economy with consumer i’s
consumption set Xi, endowment ωi and his utility function ui for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
We assume ui is strictly monotonic for all i.
3.2.1 Abstract Economy
The associated abstract economy with E introduced in the seminal paper of
Arrow and Debreu (1954) has n+1 agents, with agent 0 being the fictitious agent
called the market auctioneer and the other n agents being the consumers in E .
The choice set of agent 0 consists of non-negative price vectors and his objective is
to minimize the extent to which the economy is out of equilibrium. More precisely,
agent 0 has choice set
X0 = {(p, 1) ∈ <l+ | p ∈ <l−1+ }, (3.1)
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where l is the number of commodities and the l-th good is chosen as the numeraire.
Agent 0 has the following objective function:
u0(x, p) =
L∑
h=1
ph min{
n∑
i=1
(xih − ωih), 0}, (x, p) ∈
n∏
i=1
Xi ×X0. (3.2)
A justification of the preceding objective function and its consistency with the
objective of the auctioneer are provided in the following remark.
Remark 1. The objective function of the market auctioneer formulated in (2)
focuses on commodities with positive excess supplies only. A justification for this
formulation is as follows. First, the formulation is equivalent to the minimization
of the total value of excess supplies over commodities whose excess supplies are
positive. Due to the Walras Law, no commodity has positive excess supply if and
only if no commodity has positive excess demand. Thus, to minimize the value
of total excess supply is consistent with the auctioneer’s objective to minimize the
extent to which the economy is out of equilibrium.
Each consumer 1 ≤ i ≤ n chooses an affordable bundle xi ∈ Xi so as to
maximize his utility function. The affordability of a consumption bundle for
consumer i is determined by his initial endowment and the price vector chosen
by the market auctioneer. Thus, given the auctioneer’s choice p ∈ X0, agent i’s
affordable bundles consist of Xi(p) = {x ∈ Xi | p · xi ≤ p · ωi}. His objective is to
solve:
maxui(xi) subject to xi ∈ Xi(p). (3.3)
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In summary, the Arrow-Debreu abstract economy associated with economy E
is the collection (Xi, Ai, ui)
n
i=0 as specified in (1)-(3). The abstract economy is,
however, a pseudo-game, in that the feasibility of agent i’s choice depends on
the simultaneous choice by agent 0. Nevertheless, Nash equilibria of the abstract
economy are competitive equilibria of economy E and vice versa.
3.2.2 Dynamic Variation
We consider a dynamic variation of the abstract economy that has the following
two stages. In stage 1, the auctioneer moves by choosing a price vector p ∈ X0.
In Stage 2, consumers observe the auctioneer’s choice of a price vector p and
then simultaneously and independently make choices, with Xi(p) as consumer i’s
feasible choice set for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n. While a strategy of the auctioneer is a
price vector in X0, a strategy of consumer i is a mapping xi : X0 −→ Xi such
that xi(p) ∈ Xi(p) for all p ∈ X0.
It turns out that Nash equilibrium allocations of the dynamic abstract economy
need not be the same as Walrasian equilibrium allocations. The following example
provides an illustration.
Example 1: Consider an economy E = (Xi, ωi, ui)ni=1, where n = 2, ω1 = (1, 0),
ω2 = (0, 1), Xi = <2+ and ui(xi) = xi1xi2 for xi ∈ Xi and i = 1, 2. Assume
that good 2 is the numeraire. This economy has a unique competitive equilibrium
consisting of p∗ = (1, 1) and x∗i = (
1
2
, 1
2
) for i = 1, 2. Now consider strategies x1(·)
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for consumer 1 and x2(·) for consumer 2, where
x1(p) =

(1
2
, 1), if p = (2, 1)
ω1, otherwise
and x2(p) = (
1
2p1
,
1
2
)
Neither consumer would deviate as their consumption bundles are utility maxi-
mizing subject to budget constraint at price vector p. Nor would the auction-
eer, because a payoff of −1
2
when choosing price vector p = (2, 1) is the highest
payoff he can possibly obtain given the consumers’ strategies (x1(·), x2(·)). There-
fore, consumers’ strategies (x1(·), x2(·)) together with the auctioneer’s price vector
p = (2, 1) constitute a Nash equilibrium. However, neither market clears at this
Nash equilibrium, implying that this Nash equilibrium allocation fails to be the
unique competitive equilibrium allocation.
Consumer 1’s Nash equilibrium strategy x1(·) in Example 1 is sequentially
irrational, since choosing ω1 = (1, 0) at price vectors p 6= (2, 1) always leads to
a 0 payoff which is strictly dominated. Subgame perfection eliminates this type
of sequential irrationality. Indeed, it turns out that the set of subgame-perfect
equilibria coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. This is shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let E = (Xi, ωi, ui)ni=1 be an exchange economy. Then, each subgame-
perfect equilibrium allocation of the dynamic abstract economy is a Walrasian
equilibrium allocation and vice versa.
96
Proof. First, we show that a WE, (p∗, x∗) ∈ <l+ × <nl+ , for E is a SPE alloca-
tion. To this end, consider strategy profile (p∗, {x∗i (·)}ni=1), where {x∗i (·)}ni=1 is the
profile of consumers’ demand functions that are derived by the following utility
maximization problems: for i = 1, 2, · · · , n and p ∈ X0, x∗i (p) solves
max
xi∈<L+
ui(xi)
subject to xi ∈ {x ∈ Xi |
L∑
h=1
ph(xih − ωih) ≤ 0}.
The auctioneer’s strategy p∗ is optimal given the consumers’ strategies because
u0(x
∗(p∗), p∗) =
L∑
h=1
p∗h min{
n∑
i=1
(x∗ih(p
∗)− ωih), 0} = 0
and u0(x
∗(p), p) ≤ 0 for p ∈ X0. Therefore, u0(x∗(p∗), p∗) ≥ u0(x∗(p), p) for
p ∈ X0. Since x∗i (p) is utility maximizing for all i and for all p ∈ X0, it follows
that (x∗i (p))
n
i=1 form a Nash equilibrium for the subgame led to by the the auc-
tioneer’s strategy p. This shows that (p∗, {x∗i (·)}ni=1) is a SPE. Furthermore, by
construction, x∗i = x
∗
i (p
∗) for all i. Consequently, the WE allocation (x∗i )
n
i=1 is a
SPE allocation.
Next, let (p¯, x¯(·)) ∈ <l+×<nl+ be a SPE. Notice that the payoff of the auctioneer
in SPE must be zero, since he can always choose a WE market-clearing price vector
that generates him a zero payoff. It follows from the auctioneer’s payoff functional
form that it must be
∑
h :
∑n
i=1(x¯ih(p¯)−ωih)<0
p¯h min{
n∑
i=1
(x¯ih(p¯)− ωih), 0} = 0.
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Consequently, for commodity h with
∑n
i=1(x¯ih(p¯)−ωih) < 0, we must have p¯h = 0.
However, the strict monotonicity of consumers utility functions implies that there
cannot be any free good in SPE. Therefore, we have
∑n
i=1(x¯ih(p¯) − ωih) = 0, for
all h = 1, ..., L. This concludes that (p¯, x¯(·)) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Our dynamic abstract economy differs from the abstract economy only in terms
of the timing between the move by the auctioneer and those by the consumers.
Theorem 1 shows that the dynamic abstract economy matches Walrasian general
equilibrium very well both in terms of the timings of the moves and the solutions.
We show in the next section that results of this paper can be extended to allow
for information asymmetry.
3.3 Dynamic Abstract Economy with Asymmet-
ric Information
Our analysis in the previous section was based on complete information. In
this section, we consider the case with incomplete information. When information
is symmetric (i.e., all agents have the same information), the case can be analyzed
in a similar way as with complete information using expected utility functions.
Our analysis in this section focuses on asymmetric information.
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3.3.1 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Following Mas-Colell et al. (1995), we consider an economy with asymmet-
ric information and rational expectations as follows. There is a single period in
which one of the states s ∈ S = {1, 2, · · · , S} will occur. Denote by ps the price
vector and xis agent i commodity bundle in state s. There is a common prior
pi = (pi(1), · · · , pi(S)) over the states. Agent i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility function over random vectors xi = (xi1, · · · , xiS) of state-dependent
commodity bundles is given by
Ui(xi) =
S∑
s=1
piisuis(xis),
where pii = (pii(1), · · · , pii(S)) is consumer i’s updated belief about the states
and uis is consumer i’s Bernoulli utility function in state s. Consumer i’s initial
endowment is state-dependent ωi = (ωi1, · · · , ωiS), where ωis is the endowment
consumer i receives conditional on the occurrence of state s. In addition, consumer
i’s private information is described by a signal function σi : S −→ <. Consumer i
can distinguish states s, s′ ∈ S if and only if σi(s) 6= σi(s′). It is assumed that for
all i and s, s′ ∈ S, ωis = ωis′ whenever σi(s) = σi(s′). This means that consumer i
can extract no information on the state from his endowment not already revealed
to him by his signal.
The timing of the model is as follows: (i) a state s ∈ S occurs in the beginning
of the period; (ii) consumer i receives endowment ωis and signal σi(s);
2 (iii) the
2That is, the auctioneer observes all the signals of consumers as discussed in papers on
rational expectations equilibrium models (e.g., [25]).
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spot commodity markets operate after all consumers receive their endowments
and signals; (iv) the state gets revealed and consumption takes place at the end
of the period.
For s ∈ S, let p(s) be the price vector that are expected to prevail in state s
by consumers. Viewing p(s) as a public signal, when state s occurs, consumer i
knows that event Si(σi(s), p(s)) occurs where
Si(σi(s), p(s)) = {s′ ∈ S : σi(s′) = σi(s), p(s′) = p(s)}. (3.4)
Thus, consumer i can use (4) to update the common prior pi:
pii(s
′|σi(s), p(s)) =

pi(s′)∑
s′′∈Si(σi(s),p(s)) pi(s
′′) , s
′ ∈ Si(σi(s), p(s)),
0, otherwise
(3.5)
It follows that when sate s occurs, consumer i’s interim utility at random vector
xi = (xi(1), · · · , xi(S)) is given by
Ui(xi|σi(s), p(s)) =
∑
s′∈S
pii(s
′|σi(s), p(s))uis′(xi(s′)). (3.6)
With (4), (5), and (6) in place, we are now ready to define rational expectations
equilibrium:
Definition 1. A REE is composed of a vector of state-dependent prices p∗ =
(p∗(s))s∈S and a vector of state-dependent commodity bundles x∗i = (x
∗
i (s))s∈S for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n, such that
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i) for all i and s ∈ S, x∗i (s) solves
max
xi∈<lS+
∑
s′∈Si(σi(s),p∗(s))
pii(s
′ | σi(s), p∗(s))uis′(xi(s′))
subject to p∗(s) · xi(s) ≤ p∗(s) · ωi(s) (affordability)
xi(s
′) = xi(s), s ∈ Si(p∗(s), σi(s)) (measurability)
ii)
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i (s) =
∑n
i=1 ωi(s), s ∈ S.
The notion of the rational expectations equilibrium recognizes the role of the
market price as an information aggregator? Furthermore, it takes into consid-
eration the fact that the market participants infer information from the market
price.
3.3.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Consider the dynamic abstract economy with asymmetric information. As
with the previous section, there are n + 1 players with agent 0 as the market
auctioneer and the consumers as the other n agents. The timing of the game
is as follows: (i) nature draws a state s ∈ S according to the common prior pi,
and then reveals the private signal σi(s) to consumer i = 1, 2, · · · , n and the
collection σ(s) = (σ1(s), · · · , σn(s)) to the market auctioneer; (ii) the auctioneer
chooses a price vector p; (iii) consumers observe the market auctioneer’s choice
and simultaneously and independently choose affordable bundles; (iv) the state
gets revealed and consumption takes place.
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An information set of the auctioneer is a subset of states which he cannot
distinguish using his signal σ(·). Formally, the auctioneer’s information set con-
taining state s is
S0(s) = {s′ ∈ S | σ(s′) = σ(s)},∀s ∈ S. (3.7)
In comparison, as a later mover, each consumer i gets to observe the auctioneer’s
choice and receives his private signal. Correspondingly, an information set of
consumer i containing state s and spot market price vector p is identified as
Si(s, p) = {(s′, p)|σi(s′) = σi(s)}.
A strategy is a complete plan of action that specifies in advance what moves a
player would make in every contingency that might arise. Here, a contingency that
may arise from player i’s point of view is that one of his information set has been
reached. Thus, a strategy for the auctioneer is a mapping that maps information
sets S0(s) into price vectors in <l+. For convenience we write a strategy for the
auctioneer as p(·) = (p(s))s∈S , where it is required that
p(s) = p(s′) for s, s′ ∈ S : S0(s) = S0(s′) (measurability)
On the other hand, a strategy for agent i ≥ 1 is a mapping that maps information
set Si(s, p) into a bundle xi(s, p) ∈ <l+ such that
p · xi(s, p) ≤ p · ωis (affordability)
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For convenience, we write the strategy as xi(·) = (xi(s, p))s∈S,p∈<l+ , where
xi(s, p) = xi(s
′, p) for s, s′ ∈ S, p ∈ <l+ : Si(s, p) = Si(s′, p) (measurability)
Given that consumer i anticipates that the auctioneer will play strategy p(·) =
(p(s))s∈S and observes spot market price vector p, he knows that the event
Si(s, σi(·), p, p(·)) occurs after the occurrence of s ∈ S, where
Si(s, σi(·), p, p(·)) =

{s′|p(s′) = p(s), σi(s′) = σi(s)}, p = p(s),
{s′|p(s′) = p, σi(s′) = σi(s)}, p 6= p(s), p ∈ p(S),
{s′|σi(s′) = σi(s)}, p /∈ p(S).
(3.8)
The middle information set of consumer i on the right hand side follows the event
that signal σi(s) is received and spot market price vector p is observed, where p
is the price vector the auctioneer will choose for some state the auctioneer is able
to distinguish from state s.
When state s occurs, the auctioneer can update his belief about the states as
follows
pi0(s
′) =

pi(s′)∑
s′′∈S0(s) pi(s
′′) , s
′ ∈ S0(s),
0, otherwise.
(3.9)
In contrast, conditional on state s occurring and observing spot price vector p,
agent i can update his belief about the states as follows.
pii(s
′|σi(s), p, p(·)) =

pi(s)∑
s′′∈S(s,σi(s),p,p(·)) pi(s
′′) , s
′ ∈ Si(s, σi(s), p, p(·)),
0, otherwise.
(3.10)
103
With (7)-(10) in place, we are ready to define perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the
dynamic abstract economy with asymmetric information.
Definition 2. A PBE of the dynamic abstract economy is a strategy profile
(p∗(·), x∗(·)) and a belief system pi∗(·) = (pi∗0(·), pi∗1(·), · · · , pi∗n(·)) such that (i)
(p∗(·), x∗(·)) is sequentially rational given the belief system pi∗(·): for all s and
price vector p ∈ <l+, p∗(s) solves
max
∑
s′∈S0(s)
u0(x
∗(s′, p∗(s′)), p∗(s′))pi∗0(s
′ | σ(s)) subject to measurability
and x∗i (s, p) solves
max
∑
s′∈Si(s,p)
usi(x
∗
i (s
′, p))pi∗i (s
′ | σ(s), p) subject to afforability and measurability
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n; (ii) pi∗i (·) is obtained by updating the prior using strategy profile
(p∗(·), x∗(·)) for i = 0, 1, · · · , n.
In PBE, players’ strategies are sequentially rational given their belief systems
represented by pi∗(·). In turn, players’ belief systems are compatible with their
strategies according to Bayes rule.
3.3.3 Equivalence between REE and PBE
With complete information, we provide an example in which Nash equilibrium
allocations of the dynamic abstract economy are not identical to the Walrasian
equilibrium allocations. Likewise, with asymmetric information, the Bayesian
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Nash equilibrium allocations of the dynamic abstract economy are not necessarily
identical to rational expectation equilibrium allocations. It is illustrated by the
following example:
Example 2: Consider a model economy with 4 states of nature: S = {(q, j) :
(1, 0), (1, 1), (3, 0), (3, 1)}, each occurring with a probability of 1/4. There are two
agents, i.e., n = 2. There are two types of goods (x,m) ∈ R2 in the economy:
one is the non-numeraire goods, the supply of which is state-dependent; the other
is the numeraire goods with a state-independent constant supply m¯ → ∞. The
endowments for both agents are in the form of (ωis,
m¯
2
) ∈ R2, where the non-
numeraire endowment ωis = j if a state of nature s = (qs, j) occurs, i.e.,
ωis =

0, if s ∈ {(1, 0), (3, 0)}
1, otherwise
for i = 1, 2. Agent 1 is risk averse and receives information signal. In particular,
u1(x1,m1) = z1 − z21 , where z1 = qs · x1 +m1. Further, the information signal for
agent 1 is:
σ1(s) =

c1, if s ∈ {(1, 0), (3, 1)}
c2, otherwise
where c1 6= c2.
Agent 2 is risk neutral and receives no information. In particular, u2(x2,m2) =
z2, where z2 = qs · s2 + m2. Further, σ2(s) = c for ∀s ∈ S. Each agent chooses
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consumption bundle (xi,mi) ∈ R2 to maximize their utilities as follows:
max
xi,mi
ui(xi,mi)
s.t. p · xi +mi ≤ p · ωi + m¯2
Since m¯ is a constant, the utility maximization problem above is equivalent to solv-
ing the following one-dimensional optimization with respect to the non-numeraire
goods only: maxxi ui(zi), where zi = qs · xi + p · (ωi − xi).
Then there is a unique R.E.E of the economy is: p(s)∗ = 2, x∗1(σ1(s)) =
−1
2
for σ1 = c1
1
2
for σ1 = c2
, and x∗2(s) =

1
2
for s = (1, 0) and (1, 1)
3
2
for s = (3, 1)
−1
2
for s = (3, 0)
.3
Consider a strategy x1(·) for agent 1 and x2(·) for agent 2 , where:
x1(σ1(s), p) =

− 1
(1−p)2+(3−p)2 if σ1(s) = c1
1
(1−p)2+(3−p)2 , if σ1(s) = c2
, x2(p) =

1
2
, if p = 1
−1, otherwise
Neither consumers would deviate as their consumption bundles are utility max-
imizing at price p = 1. Nor would the auctioneer, since an expected payoff of 0 is
the highest payoff he can possibly get given the two agents strategies. Therefore,
agentrs’ strategies and p = 1 constitute a BNE. However, the market is not clear
in every state.
Agent 2’s Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy x2(·) is sequential irrational,
because choosing -1 at price p = 1 leads to negative payoff which are strictly
3See Appendix for proof.
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dominated by any other positive demand. Perfect Bayesian game eliminates this
type of sequential irrationality. Parallel to the equivalence between SPE and
WE allocations with complete information, we now show that PBE and REE
allocations are identical with asymmetric information.
Theorem 2. PBE allocations of the dynamic abstract economy are REE alloca-
tions and vice versa.
Proof. First, we show that an REE, (p∗(·), x∗(·)) ∈ <lS+ × <lnS+ , is a PBE alloca-
tion. To this end, consider strategy profile (p(·), {xi(·)}ni=1) where p(s) = p∗(s),
xi(·) is measurable, xi(s, p) = x∗i (s) if p = p(s), and xi(s, p) is any affordable
bundle at price vector if p 6= p(s), for all s = 1, · · · , S, p ∈ <l+, and i = 1, · · · , n.
Then, by construction, the market auctioneer’s interim payoff at strategy pro-
file (p(·), {xi(·)}ni=1) is 0, which is the highest interim payoff for him. It follows
that the market auctioneer’s strategy p(·) is optimal given the strategies of the
other agents. On the other hand, for i ≥ 1, consumer i’s bundle xi(·) is utility
maximizing; hence, it is optimal for consumer i given the strategies of the other
agents.
Now let strategy profile (p∗(·), x∗(·)) be a PBE. We show that (p(s), x(s))
with p(s) = p∗(s) and xi(s) = x∗i (s, p
∗(s)) is a REE. This direction is more
involved. Fortunately, the measurability constraint helps to simplify the proof.
Notice first that the affordability and measurability of x∗i (·) as consumer i’s PBE
strategy automatically implies the afforability with respect to price function p(·)
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and measurability of xi(·) as consumer i REE state-contingent bundle. Since
the optimality of xi(·) as consumer i REE state-contingent bundle is required
conditional on information sets in the first line on the right hand side of (8), it
follows from (10) that the sequentiality of x∗i (·) as consumer i’s PBE strategy
implies the optimality of xi(·) as consumer i’s REE state-contingent bundle.
By measurability, for s = 1, 2, · · · , S, p(s′) = p(s) for s′ ∈ S0(s) and xi(s′, p) =
xi(s, p) for s
′ ∈ Si(s, p), p ∈ <l+. Since S0(s) ⊇
⋂n
i=1 Si(s, p), we have xi(s
′, p) =
xi(s, p) for all s
′ ∈ S0(s). Thus, by (7) and (9), the interim utility of the auctioneer
conditional on state s can be simplified to:
∑
s′∈S0(s)
l∑
h=1
ph(s
′) min{
n∑
i=1
(xih(s
′, p(s′))− ωih(s′)), 0} · pi0(s′ | σ(s))
=
l∑
h=1
ph(s) min{
n∑
i=1
(xih(s)− ωih(s)), 0} ·
∑
s′∈S0(s)
pi0(s
′ | σ(s))
=
l∑
h=1
ph(s) min{
n∑
i=1
(xih(s)− ωih(s)), 0}
Using the last expression together with the sequential rationality of the agents’
strategies, a similar reasoning as with the complete information case shows that
the price vector p(s) clears the spot markets.
The notion of rational expectations equilibrium is a natural extension of Wal-
rasian equilibrium to allow for information asymmetry. Theorem 2 shows that
the equivalence result in Theorem 1 is robust with respect to information asym-
metries.
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on game-theoretic foundations of gen-
eral equilibrium theory. We considered a dynamic variation of the abstract econ-
omy in Arrow and Debreau (1954) to more closely capture the timing of moves of
the Walrasian model of market exchange. Our dynamic abstract economy yields
a well defined game in extensive form. As such, various game-theoretic solution
concepts can be applied to the dynamic abstract economy. Indeed, we showed
that the set of SPE allocations coincides with the set of WE allocations with
complete information; the set of PBE allocations coincides with the REE alloca-
tions with asymmetric information. These coincidence results provide useful tools
for analyzing and refining WE and REE allocations.
3.5 Appendix
Proof for Example 2
The orginal setup:
For a state s ∈ S, if σ1(s) = c1, i.e., when s ∈ {(1, 0), (3, 1)}. Then the utility
maximization problem for agent 1 is:
max
x1
1
2
[
u1
(
(1− p)x1
)
+ u1
(
(3− p)x1 + 1
)]
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Then one obtains x1(σ1(s)) = − 1(1−p)2+(3−p)2 when σ1(s) = c1. If σ2(s) = c2,
i.e., when s ∈ {(1, 1), (3, 0)}, then the utility maximization problem for agent 1
becomes:
max
x1
1
2
[
u1
(
(1− p)x1 + 1
)
+ u1
(
(3− p)x1
)]
One obtains x1(σ1(s)) =
1
(1−p)2+(3−p)2 when σ1(s) = c2.
The following is the utility of agent 1 as a function of p when receiving either
type of signal:
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
p
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
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0.4
0.45
0.5
u
1
(a) σ(s) = c1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
p
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
u
1
(b) σ(s) = c2
Figure 3.1
We can see that in both cases (receiving both types of signals), the utility of
agent 1 is maximized at price p = 2. Since agent 2 receives no signal, when a
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state s ∈ S occurs, the utility maximization for agent 2 is:
max
x2
1
4
[
u2
(
(1− p)x1
)
+ u2
(
(3− p)x1 + 1
)
+ u2
(
(1− p)x1 + 1
)
+ u2
(
(3− p)x1
)]
Since u2 is linear, x2 ∈ argmaxx2
{
(8− 2p)x2 + 2
}
. p = 2 is also optimal for him
because he will surely get a positive utilty no matter how much x2 he demands.
Therefore, p∗ = 2 is a unique REE price.
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